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ABSTRACT
ANALYSIS OF SAFE SEPARATION DISTANCES
FROM
NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION PIPELINES
by
James Stephen Haklar
Accidental rupture of natural gas transmission pipelines with subsequent ignition of the
escaping gas can result in the loss of life and property. In the United States, current
means of protecting both the pipeline and the public include the establishment of class
locations, in which specific pipeline design, construction and operation requirements
must be attained. In addition, distances at which the pipelines can be safely set back from
the community, called safe separation distances, have been developed in some European
countries (e.g., Great Britain, the Netherlands) through use of risk assessment principles.
However, to date there has been no simple, consistent method for determining these
distances.
A method for evaluating safe separation distances is proposed herein, in which the
point source method for determining heat flux is coupled with relationships for predicting
both the mass release rate from the rupture and the flame height of the ignited gas. The
method is utilized to develop charts for predicting safe separation distances based on
pipeline operating pressure and nominal pipeline diameter. The method is compared to
information from both actual pipeline accidents reported upon by the National
Transportation Safety Board and from the work of prior researchers utilizing other
methodologies. The comparisons reveal that the method proposed in this thesis can
produce results that are consistent with the above sets of data tested.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Natural gas is most commonly transported between collection and distribution points
through a series of interstate pipelines called transmission pipelines. According to the
Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council, there are approximately
271,000 miles of natural gas transmission lines in the United States. The lines are
typically constructed of steel, operate between 400 and 1,500 pounds per square inch
(psi) of pressure and are buried under 2.5 feet to 3 feet or more of cover (1).
Increased development of formerly sparsely populated areas has resulted in
instances of encroachment of transmission pipeline rights-of-way (ROWs). Accidental
ruptures of these pipelines with subsequent ignition of the escaping gas can result in the
loss of life and property near these lines.
A description of the effects of such accidents can be found in the pipeline accident
reports prepared by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB is an
independent Federal agency that investigates pipeline accidents occurring in the United
States. It is worth noting that the Canadian government has established a similar agency,
called the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB). The TSB's functions are
similar to those of the NTSB, in that the NTSB also investigates transportation accidents.
One example of the destructive effects of pipeline ruptures was the rupture and
resultant fire occurring at Beaumont Kentucky, on April 27, 1985 involving a 30-inch
diameter natural gas line operating at 992 pounds per square inch gauge (psig). This
accident killed 5 persons, injured 3 and, excluding the pipeline, resulted in one million
1

dollars worth of damage (2). More recently, a 36-inch pipeline operating at a pressure of
970 psig exploded in Edison, New Jersey. This accident occurred on March 23, 1994 and
severely affected a nearby apartment complex. The apartment complex sustained $12.4
million in damages, which includes the loss of eight apartment buildings, severe damage
to six buildings and minor damage to several other buildings (3). These two examples
serve to illustrate the importance of determining the proximity at which pipelines can be
safely sited near a community. These distances are called "safe separation distances."
In the United States, pipelines are regulated by the U.S. Department of
Transportation pursuant to the statutory authority of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act
of 1968. The implementing regulations can be found in Parts 191 and 192 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR). The regulations establish a series of four class locations,
within which specific design, construction and operational requirements must be met.
Class locations extend 220 yards on either side of the centerline of any 1 mile length of
pipeline, and are differentiated as follows (4):
Class I Location: Has 10 or less buildings intended for human occupancy.
Class 2 Location: Has more than 10 but less than 46 buildings intended for human
occupancy.
Class 3 Location: Has 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or an area
where the pipeline lies within 100 yards of either a building or a small, well defined
outside area (such as a playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place of
public assembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10
weeks in any 12 month period.

3

Class 4 Location: Where buildings with four or more stories above ground are prevalent.
It should be noted that each separate living unit in a multiple unit building is
counted as a separate building intended for human occupancy.
As indicated above, each class location has specific requirements that pertain to
the design, construction and operation of a pipeline. For example, the regulations specify
that the design pressure for steel pipe be determined in accordance with the following
equation:
P=(2St/D)xFxExT
In the above equation, P represents the design pressure (prig); S is the yield strength
(psi); D is the outside diameter (inches); t is the wall thickness (inches); and F, E and T
are, respectively, the design factor, longitudinal joint factor and temperature derating
factor (all dimensionless). As indicated in the regulations (5), the pressure design factors
for steel pipe can vary from 0.72 to 0.40 as the Class Location varies from 1 to 4. The
United States regulations, however, do not specify required separation distances between
a natural gas pipeline and buildings in proximity to the pipeline.
Other countries have likewise established regulations for natural gas pipelines (5).
Canada has developed a four class location system which is almost identical to the system
used in the United States. The German regulations establish separation distances which
are dependent on the diameter of the pipe. However, the regulations indicate that the
right of way "is to protect the pipeline" (as opposed to protecting the community).
Australia's regulations provide for six class locations, but (as with the United States and
Canadian regulations) do not specify minimum separation distances between pipelines

4
and neighboring structures. While the Japanese regulations specify minimum separation
distance requirements from select receptors (such as schools, theaters, train stations, etc.),
these requirements apply to above-ground pipelines only.
The United Kingdom has developed 3 classifications, with the separation
distances to existing occupied structures being a function of the specific classification, the
operating pressure and the outside diameter of the pipe. However, the minimum
separation distance requirements decrease with increased population density (which
allows for siting of pipelines in heavily populated areas).
Since 1972, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) of Great Britain has been
providing advice to planning authorities concerning the potential risks and effects of
hazards to neighboring populations. However, HSE guidance for construction near
pipelines is still under development (6).
As described in information provided by Hans van Poelje of N.V. Nederlandse
Gasunie (personal communication, November 30, 1995), the Dutch have established four
area classes, and have identified two separation distances - effect and building distances.
The Dutch zoning guidelines recommend building outside of the effect distance if
possible, and it is the area inside the effect distance that is actually classified from 1 (low
population density) to 4 (high density). The effect and building distances depend on the
diameter and pressure of the pipe, and are based on calculated contours of individual risk

5
(which vary from 10' to 10 .6 ). Individual risk is defined by the Dutch (H. van Poelje:
personal communication, September 30, 1996) as being the probability per year of the
death of a person who stands 24 hours a day undressed at a certain distance from the
pipeline.
In general, both the United States and foreign countries address the establishment
of separation distances either directly, or indirectly through the designation of various
location or population classes. In those instances where a defined allowable ROW has
been established, the width of the ROW from the pipe centerline is relatively small (less
than 100 feet) and is generally intended to protect the pipe rather than the public.

Separation distances have also been developed by some countries based on the concept of
risk assessment. This dissertation describes the development of a methodology to
estimate actual separation distances required, based upon the effects of a rupture of a
natural gas transmission pipeline of a specified diameter and operating pressure. The
methodology is developed, in part, with data collected from prior investigations of actual
natural gas transmission pipeline accidents.
The dissertation is presented in seven chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction.
Chapter 2 discusses the literature review that has been performed; Chapter 3 provides the
objective of the dissertation. Chapter 4 develops a new methodology by which safe
separation distances can be determined. This technique is then compared, in Chapter 5,
to actual pipeline accident data, and to the work of previous researchers. The results of
the dissertation are presented and discussed in Chapter 6, while Chapter 7 provides
conclusions and recommendations for future work.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of the literature review was to gain an understanding of prior research
concerning both natural gas pipeline accidents and the determination of safe separation
distances from natural gas transmission pipelines. The literature review consisted of the
following activities:
Review of NTSB files in Washington, DC;
Review of Commodity Pipeline Occurrence Reports, prepared by the Canadian
TSB;
Review of databases compiled by the New Jersey Institute of Technology's
(NJIT's) Institute for Transportation containing relevant citations of pipeline
accidents and safe separation distances;
Correspondence with the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group located in
the Netherlands;
Review of various texts pertaining to pipelines, hazard assessment, heat transfer
and fluid flow;
Review of technical journals of the oil and gas pipeline industry; and
Discussions with the NTSB, the Canadian TSB, the Canadian National Energy
Board, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, the American Gas
Association, the Research and Special Programs Administration, the Gas
Research Institute, and the Township of Edison regarding pipeline accidents and
safe separation distances.
6

7
In general, the literature review revealed that there has been limited studies to date
concerning the determination of safe separation distances. Before discussing the prior
research, however, the properties of natural gas and the principles of fluid flow are
discussed below.

2.1 Natural Gas and its Properties
Natural gas is composed primarily of methane. A typical commercial field gas has the
following molar composition (7):

Table 2.1
Composition of Natural Gas

Component
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Carbon Dioxide
Methane
Ethane
Propane
I sobutane
Normal Butane
I sopentane
Normal Pentane
Hexane
Heptane
Octane
Toluene

Mole
Percent
0.0008
1.498
1.073
83.266
9.608
3.597
0.3414
0.4581
0.0403
0.0342
0.0046
0.0003
0.0001
0.0002

°

3

Natural Gas generally has a gross heat content of 1,000 Btu/ft measured dry at 60 F and

°

30 inches (or one atmosphere) of mercury (8). Since 60 F and 1 atmosphere are
considered to be respectively the standard conditions for temperature and pressure in the
gas industry (NTSB: personal communication, February 23, 1996), the heat content can
be expressed as 1,000 Btu per standard cubic foot (set).
Since methane is the primary constituent of natural gas, the gas mixture will
exhibit physical properties similar to the properties for pure methane. At 1 atmosphere,

°

°

methane has a freezing point in air of -296.46 F and a boiling point of -258.68 F (8).
Therefore, at standard conditions, methane exists as a gas. Thermodynamically, the ratio
of heat capacity at constant pressure (Cp) to heat capacity at constant volume (Cv) for

°

°

methane varies from 1.39 at -150 F to 1.25 at 150 F (8).
Methane is a combustible gas, and has a lower flammability limit of
approximately 5% by volume (8). The upper flammability limit is approximately 15% by
volume (8). This implies that mixtures of methane and air will burn if the mixture
contains between 5% and 15% (by volume) of methane. Outside of this range, the
mixture is either too lean or too rich to burn.
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Natural gas containing hydrogen sulfide is called sour gas. An example of a sour
gas mixture (9) is presented in Table 2.2:

Table 2.2
Composition of Sour Gas

Component
Nitrogen
Carbon Dioxide
Hydrogen Sulfide
Methane
Ethane
Propane
Isobutane
Normal Butane
Isopentane
Normal Pentane
Hexane
Other Components

Mole
Percent
2.3046
1.1616
9.0791
58.7939
12.7407
10.3420
1.1425
3.0209
0.6091
0.5910
0.1217
0.0929

Gases (including natural gas) are considered compressible fluids. Therefore, the
following discussion will present the mathematical relationships that describe
compressible fluid flow.

2.2 Compressible Fluid Flow
2.2.1 Choked Conditions
When a vessel such as a tank is accidentally punctured (resulting in a small hole) or
intentionally blown down (through a nozzle), the gas (provided that it is at a sufficient
pressure) may leave the vessel at its sonic velocity. The sonic velocity is the speed of
sound in the gas, and is the maximum possible speed through the puncture or nozzle. A
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"choked" condition is established if the gas leaves the vessel at a velocity equal to the
sonic velocity. In order for choked flow to occur, the following criterion (assuming an
ideal gas) must be satisfied (10):
(p 2 /p ) c (2/(k+ 1 ))

k/(k- 1)

(2-3)

where:
= Absolute vessel pressure (slug/ft s -)
p 2 = Absolute pressure in the minimum section (slug/ft s`)
k = Gas specific heat ratio, Cp/Cv
c = Critical conditions
If the pressure ratio p-) /p i (absolute pressure outside of the vessel to inside the vessel) is
greater than the critical ratio and isentropic conditions are assumed (i.e., frictionless
conditions where there is no exchange of heat), then the mass flow rate out of the vessel
can be calculated as follows (10):
m

*

= A? {(2k/(k-1 ))P (1) ((P2/P1)

0

²/k

- (1)2/P )

+1)/k) 1/²

(2 4)
-

where:
_7
A² = Area of minimum section of the puncture or nozzle (ft - )
Density of gas inside vessel (slug/ft³)
m = Mass flow rate (slug/s)
If the pressure ratio p ² /p i is less than the critical ratio, then the mass flow rate is found
from (16):
(k+1 )/(k I) { 1/²
1 /2
*
m = (A2p1 /(T ) ) it (k/R)(2/k+ )

where
R = Gas constant (5- .98 ft lb/slug 0R)
= Gas temperature ( °R)

(2-5)
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2.2.2 Isothermal Pipe Flow
Gas flow in pipelines can be isothermal. For isothermal conditions to exist (i.e., the gas
temperature is constant), the heat transferred from the gas through the pipe walls is
balanced by the heat generated by friction (10). Such conditions can occur in uninsulated
pipes where velocities are much less than sonic and where the temperatures inside and
outside the pipeline are of the same order.
The following equation relates upstream and downstream pressures for isothermal
flow (16):
7
P1 7 - p 7 = (m RT/A²)(21n(p /p 7 ) -1- f(l/d))

(2-6)

where:
= Upstream pressure (slug/ft s ² )
= Downstream pressure, (slug/ft s - ) 7
A = Cross-sectional area of pipeline (ft - )
T = Gas temperature ( ° R)
R = Gas constant (5.98 ft lb/slug ° R)
= Mass flow rate (slug/s)
= Moody friction factor
I= Distance between upstream and downstream locations (ft)
d = Pipeline diameter (ft)
The above equation can also be written in terms of k (heat capacity ratio) and the
upstream and downstream Mach numbers (M 1 , M 7 respectively, where M is the ratio of
the gas velocity to the sonic velocity) (10):
²
(M 71\47 ) = 1-kM1²(21n(M2/M 1 )+f(l/d))
²

(2-7)

These equations are applicable only for the range
M I < M ? ≤ (1/k)

I /7

(2-8)
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2.2.3 Adiabatic Pipe Flow

As described by Vennard & Street (10), adiabatic conditions (i.e., conditions in which
there is no heat transfer) can occur in pipes that are either insulated or of short length.
Under these conditions, the Mach number increases downstream in subsonic flow, but
decreases downstream in supersonic flow. In both subsonic and supersonic flow, the
Mach number tends toward unity, with M =1 being the limiting condition. Given an
upstream condition, the distance "1" downstream of that location can be increased until
M=1 at the discharge location. Any further increases in "I" cannot be made without
altering the upstream conditions or creating a shock wave. The relevant equation used for
performing calculations is:
(dM ² /M 2 ) = kM²{1+((k-1)/2)M²)/ (1-M²)}f

(dl/d)

(2-9)

With this understanding of natural gas properties and compressible flow, the work
of several investigators regarding pipeline blowdown can be discussed.

2.3 Prior Research Pertaining to Pipeline Blowdown
2.3.1 Wilson
In his 1979 study for Alberta Environment, Wilson (11) developed a method for

evaluating ground-level transient gas releases for the purpose of assessing risks from sour
gas pipeline ruptures. As described by Wilson, automatic block valves are used to isolate
the ruptured pipeline segment. Furthermore, during blowdown, the following time
periods exist:
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Soon after the rupture, an expansion wave moves down the pipeline at a velocity
equal to the speed of sound. The exiting mass flow can be thought of as an
emission from a source of gas at the initial temperature and pressure of the
pipeline. Additionally, the gas is considered to flow through a pipe length which
increases with time at a rate equal to the speed of sound.
Once the wave reaches the end of the pipe, the system will behave as a gas source
of constant size which exits through a hole at one end.
Wilson performs both adiabatic and isothermal analyses of the initial moving wave
transient. Furthermore, the author also performs an analysis for an isothermal release
during the subsequent condition of constant length. An assumption is made that the
system is quasi-steady state, which means that fluid acceleration forces are small as
compared to pressure forces. The author concludes that the mass release rate models
developed through these analyses are difficult to use, and recommends using the
following double exponential model developed by R. P. Bell:
me

oe/(1+α))[exp(-t/(α²B) ))

exp(-t/(β)]

where, in dimensions of mass (M), length (L) and time (t), the terms are:
m e = Mass release rate of gas at time t (M/t)
m

oe

= Initial mass release rate calculated using Eq. 2-5 (M/t)
α = Wo/[β m

oe] (dimensionless)

W o = Total mass of gas in pipeline (M)
(3 = Final release time constant (t)

(2- 1 0)
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In his later work (12), Wilson describes the initial mass release rate as a fraction
of the value obtained by Equation 2-5:
m oe = K(m oe found using Eq. 2-5)

(2-1 1)

Where K = equals a constant less than 1, which accounts for the resistance to flow caused
by the overlying soil resting on the pipe. Wilson compares the results from two full scale
pipe rupture tests, and concludes that a K value of 0.5 provides the best fit of the double
exponential model.
In a later work concerning the risk of exposure concentrations in fluctuating
plumes (13), Wilson states that "predicting the behavior of a toxic gas plume from a
pipeline rupture is one of the most complex and difficult problems in atmospheric
diffusion." He cites complicating factors including the high pipeline pressures which
make the exiting gas supersonic and which results in large changes in gas temperature
and density. Furthermore, he indicates that the plume is sensitive to changes in terrain,
downwind obstacles and atmospheric stability. He also mentions that a "saving grace in
this messy problem" is that the release will be of short duration (30 minutes or less).

2.3.2 Groves, Bishnoi and Wallbridge
The authors (7) discuss the calculation of wave velocity in a ruptured pipeline. As
previously mentioned, the rupture of a high pressure gas pipeline results in the creation of
an expansion (or decompression) wave. This wave moves away from the rupture as the
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gas flows toward it. Since natural gas is actually a mixture of condensible gases,
decompression can result in condensation of individual compounds. Several of the
assumptions that the authors make include the following:
The flow is isentropic and nonviscous;
The rupture is instantaneous and over the full cross-section of the pipe;
Condensation occurs at constant temperature and pressure;
After condensation, the liquid mixture is in equilibrium with the gas mixture; and
The gas mixture is described by the Soave-Redlich-Kwong equation of state,
which is referenced in the authors' document.
The authors present an iterative procedure to find the wave velocity, and compare
theoretical predictions to experimental data for pure methane, argon and a natural gas
mixture. The authors conclude by stating that it is possible to calculate the
decompression wave behavior from pipeline ruptures containing pure gases or gas
mixtures.

2.3.3 Fantlelop and Ryhming
The work presented by these authors (14) involves the sudden and complete break of a
high-capacity gas transmission line. The case which is used is an underwater pipeline 90
miles long, 36 inches in diameter, with inlet and outlet pressures of 133 atm and 55 atm,
respectively. The ambient pressure outside the pipeline is 6 atm, and the line contains
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7,000 tons of gas. Isothermal flow of a perfect (i.e., ideal) gas is assumed, with the flow
also being one-dimensional, unsteady, compressible and with friction. The following
equations are then presented:
Continuity:
∂ρ/∂t +(∂/∂x)ρu = 0 (2-12)

Momentum:
∂u/∂t + u(∂u/∂x) + (1/ρ)(∂ρ/∂x) + 2fu ² /D = 0 (2-13)

Equation of state:
p = ρRTo

(2-14)

where, in dimensions of mass (M), length (L), time (t) and temperature (T), the various
terms are:

Tt²

p = gas density (M/17)) ,3
R =/ gas constant (L ²
p=resu(M/Lt²)
t = time (t)
u = gas velocity (L/t)
x = length coordinate (L)
f = friction factor (f= 0.002)
D = pipeline diameter (L)
To = seawater temperature (T)
The authors describe different time regimes following the rupture, which require
different methods of solution. The "early time regime begins with an inviscid regime
followed by a viscous expansion process. This early time regime lasts from the time of
rupture until approximately 25 seconds or the waves penetrate 10,000 meters of pipeline.
The "intermediate-time" regime lasts from approximately 25 seconds until the pressure
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peak has moved to the closed end of the pipeline, at which time the "late-time" regime
begins. When considering the low pressure end of the rupture, an intermediate region is
not considered (since the pressure decreases monotonically toward the open end).
The authors acknowledge that a general solution of the above nonlinear partial
differential equations is too complicated for routine engineering applications. They
present an integral method which can be used to find the solution for the late time regime
(which represents most of the outflow from the broken end). The authors also indicate
that this method can be used (with modification) for the intermediate regime.

2.3.4 Flatt
In his 1985 work, Flatt (15) provided a second-order algorithm which is applicable to the
inverse marching method of characteristics. This algorithm can be used to solve unsteady
compressible one-dimensional flows in which the momentum equation has a high f(L/D)
value and where the flow is in the high subsonic range. The author indicates that the
method involves only one iteration.
Flan acknowledges in another study (16) that the rupture problem is highly
non-linear, making the finding of analytical solutions unlikely. He applies the inverse
marching method of characteristics to the pipeline rupture presented in (14). The author
assumes that initial conditions are of isothermal flow, while the unsteady flow generated
after the rupture is adiabatic and one-dimensional. Additionally, the gas is considered
perfect.
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2.3.5 Lang and Fannelop

The pipeline rupture described in previously noted studies (14, 16) is again analyzed in a
subsequent study (17). The partial differential equations are reduced by the authors to a
set of ordinary differential equations by procedures used in the Method of Weighted
Residuals. The reduced equations are then integrated using various numerical methods
(Finite Element, Spectral Galerkin and Spectral Collocation). The authors assume the
flow to be one-dimensional, compressible, viscous and isothermal, with the conditions of
primary interest being those in the pipeline

~egment

associated with the high pressure

end. The authors state that the best results in terms of stability, accuracy and computing
time are obtained using the Spectral Collocation Method.

2.3.6 Ryhming
The author considers the early time regime associated with a pipeline rupture (18).
Specifically, the process of the expansion wave imparting motion to the gas particles
against wall friction is studied. The governing equations are those provided in (14), and
are solved using a matched asymptotic expansion procedure. The author also assumes
isothermal flow conditions and a perfect gas.
While the author acknowledges that numerically correct solutions are obtained by
considering the full adiabatic process, the isothermal assumption results in simpler
equations and very little is lost in terms of the gas acceleration process.
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2.17 Picard and Bishnoi
The authors use a real-fluid nonisentropic decompression model to evaluate the rupture of
a sour gas pipeline (9). This model is used for two-phase (gas-liquid) multi component
mixtures, and is based on unsteady nonisentropic one-dimensional compressible fluid
flow. The model consists of characteristic and compatibility equations that are solved
numerically using an explicit inverse marching method. Real fluid behavior is modeled
using the Peng and Robinson equation of state.
The pipeline considered is part of a gas gathering system. It is uninsulated, 168.3
mm diameter and buried 42 cm below the ground (ground temperature is 275 K). The
pre-rupture temperature of the fluid is 303 K, while the corresponding pressure is 11,000
kPa. When the pipeline is ruptured, it is assumed that an upstream emergency valve
closes, restricting the blowdown length to 1,000 m.
The authors compare the results with those obtained using the assumption of a
perfect gas, and conclude that a perfect gas assumption will underestimate the release rate
by 30 to 45% while the total amount of fluid released may be underestimated by 50%.
Additionally, the authors point out that perfect gas theory does not consider the effects of
condensation.
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2.3.8 Olorunmaiye and Imide
The authors (19) model the flow in the underwater pipeline that has been described
previously. They assume unsteady, one-dimensional isothermal flow. The
non-dimensional forms of the partial differential equations provided above are solved
using the method of characteristics. The authors indicate that the flow rate predicted at
the broken end of the pipe is 18% lower than that predicted by adiabatic flow theory, but
that the flow rate agrees with the results of Lang and Fannelop.

2.3.9 Other Work
The Pipe Line Rules of Thumb Handbook (8) provides the following equation to use
when calculating the volume of gas lost through a puncture or blowdown:
Q D P 1(2-15)
where:
Q = Volume of gas in Mcf/hr at a pressure of 14.9 psi, 60°F with a specific gravity of
0.60
D = Diameter of the nipple or orifice in inches
P I = Absolute pressure in psi at some nearby point upstream from the opening

2.4 Prior Research Pertaining to Turbulent Jet Flames and Flame Geometry
2.4.1 Turbulent Jet Flames
As described by the National Fire Protection Association and the Society of Fire
Protection Engineers (20), turbulent jet flames can form as the result of either an
accidental release of hydrocarbon vapors or the intentional burning of waste gases in a
flare. The flame is called turbulent based on the Reynolds number of the gas jet. A jet
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fuel is assumed to exit a nozzle that is pointed in an upward position. The fuel is
discharged into a surrounding medium that contains an oxidant. Starting at a low flow
rate, the flame height increases with increasing flow rate. As the flow is increased, a
maximum height is reached and then shortens. However, before reaching the maximum
height, the flame begins to flicker at the top. This point changes the flame from a laminar
diffusion flame to a transition flame. As the flow rate is increased further, the flickering
spreads down and stops several diameters from the burner. When this happens, the flame
is said to be turbulent, and the flame height becomes independent of flow rate.

2.4.2 Flame Geometry

Two important flame characteristics are the flame height and the amount of flame tilt in a
cross-wind. Hawthorne, Weddell and Hottel (21) have developed the following
relationship to predict the height of a turbulent flame in still air:
L/D (5 .3/CT) CF/αTTN))CT+(1(1-CT(MS/MN)}¹/² (2-16)
where, in dimensions of mass (M), length (L), time (t) and temperature (T), the various
terms are:
L = visible flame length (L)
D = nozzle diameter (L)
T F = adiabatic flame temperature (absolute T)
T N = temperature of nozzle fluid (absolute T)
M s = molecular weight of surrounding fluid (dimensionless)
M N = molecular weight of nozzle fluid (dimensionless)
CT = mol fraction of nozzle fluid in the unreacted stoichiometric mixture (decimal)
aT = mots of reactants/mols products for the stoichiometric mixture (decimal)

X (Direction of Cross-wind)
Figure 2.1 - Flame Shape with a Cross-wind

Z (Direction of Jet

Note: Illustration Based on Information Provided in References Numbered 20 and 22

N.)

The work of Brzustowski, as presented in (20) and Gollahalli, et al (22) provides
a procedure to determine flame shape with a cross-wind (see Figure 2.1). The procedure
begins by calculating the dimensionless lean limit concentration:
C L = C L (uj/uw)(Mp/Ma) (2-17)
where:
C L = lean limit concentration (expressed as a decimal)
.uj=velocityfj
11
u w = velocity of wind
M f = molecular weight of fuel
M a = molecular weight of air
If C L < 0.5, the curvilinear distance S L is determined from:
S L = 2.04

(CL)
,— -¹.03

(2 18)
-

If C L > 0.5, then:
- 0. 6²5

SL = 2.71 (CL) (2-19)
If S L > 2.35, then the dimensionless coordinate X L is found from:
X L = S L - 1.65

(2-20)

If S L < 2.35, then X L is determined from:
--

S L = 1.04 X L - + 2.05 XL 0.28

(2 21)
-

The dimensionless rise Z L is calculated from:
— 0.²8
ZL = 2.05 (XL)
(2 22)
-

The dimensional coordinates of the flame tip are then found from the following:
X = X Ldi (ρj/ρa)1/2(uj /u w )

(2-23)

Z Z¹ di (ρi/ρa)¹/²(ui /u w )

(2-24)

LB\/

Figure 2.2 - Jet Flame Shape Parameters

Note: Illustration Based on Information Provided in References Numbered 20 and 23
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where:
d j = Jet diameter
ρi = Density of jet
ρ a = Density of air
The work of Kalghatgi presented in (20) and (23) provides a means by which the
shape of a jet flame in a cross-wind can be described. He described the flame by a
frustum of a cone (see Figure 2.2) with the following parameters:
W I = flame base width
= flame tip width
LBV = vertical length of the flame tip from the plane of the burner
a = angle subtended by the flame with respect to the vertical
αB = angle subtended by the burner tip and the tip of the flame with respect to the
vertical
Kalghatgi also defined the burner source diameter as being
D s = D(ρi/ρa)¹/²

(2-25)

where D is the actual burner diameter. A velocity ratio, R, is also defined as:
R = cross-wind speed (U)/jet velocity (Uj)

(2-26)

The following equations are then used to find the geometric parameters (for the
range 0.02 < R < 0.25):
aB = 94 - (1.6/R) - 35R (degrees)

(2-27)

a = 94 - (1.1/R) - 30R (degrees)

(2-28)

(LBV/DS) = 6 + (2.35/R) + 20R

(2-29)

(W 2 /D s ) = 80 - (0.57/R) - 570R + 1470R ²(2-30)
(W ¹ /D s ) = 49 - (0.22/R) - 380R + 950R 2(2-3¹)
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Figure 2.3 - Conceptual Illustration of the Point Source Model

Flame

Distance from Flame Center to Observer (D)

Normal to Surface
Receiving Thermal
Radiation

Note: Illustration Based on Information in Reference Number 20

Ua

`)4

2.4.3 Heat Transfer Models
The major source of damage or injury from large open hydrocarbon fires is from thermal
radiation (20). The following discussion will present several models that can be used to
predict the thermal radiation from jet flames.

2.4.3.1 Point Source Model: The point source model assumes that the source of radiant
heat can be modeled by positioning a point source at the center of the flame (see Figure
2.3). The equation which is used to calculate the radiant heat flux is (20):
q" = Fqrelcosθ/(4πD²)

(2-32)

where:
q" = incident radiant flux, kW/m ² (or Btu/hr ft ² )
D = distance from flame center to observer, m (or ft)
qrel = energy release rate, kW (or Btu/hr)
F = fraction of combustion energy resulting in radiation
0 = angle between normal to the surface receiving the thermal radiation and line of
sight from flame center
Oenbring and Sifferman (24) provide the following form of the point source
model to use when calculating radiant heat flux from a flare:
K = FQ/(4πD

²

)

(2-33)

where:
K = radiant heat flux from a flame (Btu/hr ft
F = fraction of total heat radiated
Q = total heat content of flared gas (Btu/hr)

2
)

It can be seen from both forms of the model that the heat flux decreases with the
square of the distance (i.e., there is an inverse square relationship).

Flame

Receptor

Figure 2.4 - Conceptual Illustration of the Line Source Model

Flame Axis

Note: Ilustration Based on Information in Reference Number 25
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2.4.3.2 Line Source Model: The NFPA and SFPE (20) explain that in the line source
model, an elemental length of flame is assumed to radiate similar to a point source. The
total radiant heat flux is calculated by integrating the flux from an elemental source over
the length of the flame.
In addition, Fumarola, et al (25) have developed the following equation for use
when the thermal radiation is evenly distributed along the flame axis:
—
0.36
.36
+ h - z)² +
q = 0.043 fQ [Ax °+ h - z]/[x{(Ax
In Equation 2-34, A is equal to 3.1(d j R)

0.64

—
- x)²}³/² ]dx (2-34)

²

, R is equal to (uj /ua)(ρj/ρa)¹/ , the limits of

integration are from x equals zero to x equals x t , and the following nomenclature is used:
d.= diameter of flare stack, m
h = height of flare stack, m
f = fraction of radiant heat release
Q = total heat release, kcal/s
²
q = thermal radiation at receptor, kcal/s m
x = downstream distance, m
z = cross-stream distance, m
x = x-coordinate of receptor, m
z = z-coordinate of receptor, m
u = velocity, m/s
a = ambient air condition
j = discharge condition
t = end of the flame axis
A conceptual illustration of the line source model is provided in Figure 2.4.
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2.4.3.3 Tilted Cylinder Model: While the point source model can be used to determine
the thermal radiation from large turbulent flames, the model breaks down at locations
close to the flame (20). Another model that can be used is the tilted cylinder model (20).
This model approximates the flame by a cylindrical radiating surface. The radiant heat
flux can be calculated from the following equation:
q EτF

(2-35)

where:
,)
²
E = surface emissive power of the flame, W/m (or Btu/hr ft )
F = geometric view factor
T = atmospheric transmissivity
The surface emissive power of the flame can be found from the equation:
E

)

(2-36)

where:
Ebb = equivalent blackbody emissive power (same units as E)
k = extinction coefficient, 1/m (or 1/ft)
L = effective path length, m (or ft)

2.5 Prior Research in the Field of Hazard Analysis
2.5.1 Typical Models
There are numerous computer models that have been developed for use in the field of
hazard analysis. These models are generally used to predict the fate and transport of
hazardous materials that have been accidently released into the environment. Several of
these models are described below.
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ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) (26) was developed by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the United States Environmental
Protection Agency. The software is intended for use by emergency responders. ALOHA
performs dispersion modeling for neutrally buoyant and heavy gases and (for a variety of
chemicals) can model different sources such as tanks and pipes.
FLACS (Flame Acceleration Simulator) (27) has been used to predict gas
explosions in complex geometries. The computer model can be used in the design of
process areas (including offshore platforms). FLACS calculates parameters such as
explosion pressure and flow characteristics as a function of time and space for different
geometries and explosion situations.
SAFEMODE (Safety Assessment for Effective Management Of Dangerous
Events) and Micro HAGS (Hazard Assessment Computer System) were developed for the
United States Coast Guard (28). This system can model releases from sources such as
pressurized storage tanks, bulk storage tanks, barge, rail car and road transports) and
predict fate and transport (such as explosion effects and pool fire thermal radiation) for
over 1200 chemicals.
The Hazard model can be used with pipeline or tank storage failures (29).
Predictions can be made of the specific locations of hazardous concentration limits
(whether they are flammable or toxic limits) in the event of a release. The model treats
gas pipeline failures using one-dimensional gas dynamics.
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WHAZAN (World Bank Hazard Analysis) was developed by Technica
International Ltd. in collaboration with the World Bank (30). The overall program is
comprised of a series of consequence models. The models can predict the outflow of a
chemical, its behavior immediately after release, its dispersion in the atmosphere, and fire
or explosion events.

2.5.2 Research Performed by the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

In Europe, there are 8 major natural gas transportation companies that are collectively
called the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG). In the 1960's and early
1970's, European governments based their regulatory actions on accident data from the
United States. The European gas companies believed it was more appropriate to have
their regulations based on European data, and so they decided to establish their own
database. EGIG collects information on the technical conditions of the incident, such as
the cause of the incident, incident frequencies, the diameter of the pipeline, the pipe wall
thickness, and the thickness of the pipeline cover. The type of information that is
collected is related to incident prevention, as opposed to collecting information on the
effects of an incident once it occurs (H. van Poelje: personal communication, November
30, 1995).
Project management for EGIG is based in the Netherlands (at N.V. Nederlandse
Gasunie), and so it is appropriate to further discuss the Dutch regulations. As explained
in Chapter 1, the Dutch have established four area classes, with effect and building
distances determined through a risk analysis. One of the possible ways in which risk
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contours can be determined involves establishing the pipeline failure frequencies,
determining the probability of ignition and establishing the dose-effect relationship
(H. van Poelje: personal communication, September 30, 1996). It should be noted that
there is no internationally agreed method for risk calculation. While the Dutch definition
of individual risk is based on fatalities, this may not be the basis used by other countries.
Another basis which other countries use is casualties.

2.5.3 Research Performed by the British Health and Safety Executive

In their research report to the HSE, Hill and Catmur (31) compare individual and societal
risks for different high pressure pipelines including methane, oxygen, spiked crude oil,
NGL (natural gas liquids), gasoline, ethylene and ammonia. The authors define two
criteria for evaluating risk. ''Fatality" is defined as an impact likely to cause death
immediately or after an extended duration, while "dangerous dose or worse" is defined to
include:
Severe distress to many persons;
-

A substantial proportion of persons affected require medical attention;
Some persons are seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment; and

-

Any highly susceptible people might receive a fatal injury.
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Individual risk transects and societal F/N curves were prepared. As defined in the
report, The individual risk transects present the probability (at varying distances) that an
individual could incur a fatal injury or dangerous dose due to an accidental release from a
pipeline. F/N curves present societal risk as the probability of N or more fatalities due to
a pipeline release.
The authors determine that all pipelines except oxygen and small diameter low
pressure methane pipelines had individual risk levels greater than one in a million per
year. Additionally, the greatest number of multiple fatalities were associated with
methane, NGL and ethylene pipelines.
In a second research report prepared for the HSE, Hockey and Rew (32) review
the factors that influence the response of humans to thermal radiation. The report also
discusses and compares various methodologies for determining the effects of thermal
radiation from process fires. The authors indicate that most risk assessment
methodologies consider the speed of escape, delay before escape begins and the distance
traveled to reach shelter as factors influencing the probability of fatality.

2.5.4 Research Performed in Canada
Based on information provided by the TSB of Canada (personal communication,
February 28, 1997), a private company in Canada is developing, in coordination with the
Major Industrial Co-ordinating Council of Canada (MIACC), a document intended for
use by government officials during the planning of pipeline routes and development. The
document defines a Response Planning Area (RPA) to be an area where public safety
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issues (such as emergency response and preparedness) should be addressed. The RPA is
developed using consequence modeling, and is based on the following major factors:
Source parameters (e.g., pipeline diameter and flow, and the properties of the
transported material);
Transport parameters which are used to evaluate the migration of material or
energy from the pipeline; and

Damage criteria
The RPAs are intended to be presented as graphs (for example, distance to a specified
damage criteria as a function of pipeline diameter and pressure).
In addition to the aforementioned information, the TSB of Canada likewise
provided (personal communication, February 28, 1997) information on guidelines,
developed by the Canadian Standards Association, for performing risk analyses on
pipelines in Canada. As stated in these guidelines, the intent is to:
"(a) identify the role of risk analysis within the context of an overall risk
management process;
(b) set out standard terminology that is consistent with existing Canadian
standards in the field of risk management;
(c) identify in general terms the components of the risk analysis process, the
associated data requirements, and the requirements for documentation and
records; and
(d) where applicable, provide reference to methodological guidelines for risk
analysis".
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2.5.5 Research Performed by NJIT

The NJIT Institute for Transportation (33) has reviewed NTSB Pipeline Accident Reports
(PARS) for the purpose of determining the burn radius associated with natural gas
pipeline failures involving fires. The authors acknowledge that there are many factors
that contribute to the development of a burn radius (e.g., rupture geometry, wind
conditions, terrain geometry, duration of release and quantity of material released, etc.).
However, the authors maintain that it is still possible to determine an upper bound on the
extent of the burn radius. The upper bound was found to be a 92 foot radius at an incident
operating pressure of 260 psig, and a 610 foot radius at a pressure of 987 psig.
The authors also found a close correlation between the occurrence of a natural gas
pipeline explosion and fire, and its resultant burn radii. Fire damage is a function of the
radiant energy produced by a fire, and the authors indicate that after an explosion there is
less natural gas available to produce radiant energy. Therefore, the authors conclude that
the burn radius associated with explosions and fires is less than that associated with only
fires for similar natural gas pipeline operating conditions.

2.6 Conclusions from Literature Review

The prior research reviewed and cited herein is predominantly concerned with predicting
which sections of a pipeline are most vulnerable to damage and predicting the loss of
product during an actual pipeline rupture (i.e., blowdown), rather than directed to
concerns associated with establishment of adequate safe separation distances for the
public.
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The above research emphasis probably exists because the risk of injury and
fatality to the general public related to natural gas pipeline ruptures has been documented
by reviewing agencies to be minimal compared to other incidents which human beings
may encounter (Le., due to falls, drowning, poisoning, fires and burns, etc.) during their
normal lifetime.
The modeling of product loss during a pipeline rupture, which is an important
factor related to the establishment of a safe separation distance therefrom, is, as indicated
in a number of research papers reviewed, difficult to simulate. This is due to disparity
amongst researchers as to whether blowdown in the pipeline should be modeled as an
adiabatic or isothermal condition; whether the fluid is viscous or nonviscous; whether the
flow regime is isentropic or nonisentropic and consequently whether the natural gas
should be treated as a perfect gas or a real fluid. Further, the prior research suggests that
the gas may change from one physical state to another within the pipeline during the
course of the same blowdown event.
In addition to the above-noted complexities in attempting to accurately simulate
the fluid dynamics within a pipeline during a blowdown situation, there are a number of
other factors which directly influence the required safe separation distance that should be
established between a specific natural gas pipeline and its neighboring potentially
impacted public at large. These factors include: the pipeline diameter; operating
pressure; location of and time needed for emergency closure of the closest valves located
upstream and downstream of the rupture; the interconnections (if any) with other
pipelines in the vicinity of the rupture; the physical orientation (i.e., the nature and
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location of the break) of the rupture; the depth of cover over the pipeline; and the
atmospheric conditions (e.g. wind velocity, wind direction, etc.) in the immediate vicinity
of the pipeline at the time of rupture. In attempting to predict, with the use of a
generalized mathematical model, the impacts of all these variables both independently
and jointly, it appears that an accurate single point estimate of associated safe separation
distance would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to develop.
The available hazard assessment models reviewed herein have been developed
primarily for utilization by private industry and the Federal government, and are designed
for generalized hazard assessment purposes. The models can be extremely expensive to
purchase, and are, in many instances, proprietary in nature. Furthermore, specific
documentation associated with the nature of the model development, such as the structure
of the computer codes, is lacking in the published material associated with the
above-noted models. As such, attempts to extract meaningful information related to this
thesis have resulted in limited success.
The literature review also revealed that the available database of information
associated with actual natural gas pipeline accident occurrences in the United States is
limited. For example, it was previously indicated that the NTSB investigates and reports
upon pipeline accidents in the United States. However, the NTSB does not investigate all
pipeline accidents; the criteria that triggers an actual NTSB investigation relates to the
extent of property damage and whether injuries or fatalities result from the accident. The
results of the investigations that are performed are published as PARs. Also, a review of
the available PARs by this author indicates that there is an inconsistency in the type of
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information gathered by the NTSB for each accident. For example, the PARs do not
consistently report the total volume of gas lost in an accident, nor the location of the
closest valves upstream and downstream of the pipeline rupture. Furthermore, supporting
information for the more dated PARs (in the PAR dockets in Washington, DC) is
periodically destroyed.
The Commodity Pipeline Occurrence Reports prepared by the Canadian TSB are
similar to the PARs in that there are also inconsistencies in the extent of information
contained in these reports. Further, the Canadian TSB investigates an extremely small
number of accidents (i.e., approximately one percent of all pipeline accidents in Canada).
Because of all the aforementioned reasons, it is concluded herein that an approach
to advance the state-of-the-art in the discipline of pipeline risk analysis is to develop a
reliable estimation technique to conservatively predict safe separation distances to be
articulated between the public and the ruptured natural gas pipeline. To aid in this
development, the literature review indicates that extensive work has been performed in
determining turbulent jet flame characteristics. In addition, the previously noted point
source model can be utilized to calculate the heat flux generated at various distances from
industrial flares. As will be seen in the following chapters, this model can be applied to
the evaluation of safe separation distances which can be considered by regulatory
agencies to protect the quality of life of residents located in proximity to natural gas
pipelines.

CHAPTER 3
OBJECTIVE OF THE DISSERTATION
AND
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION RATIONALE

As noted in Chapter 2 in the literature search and the analysis thereof, there is
considerable complexity involved in attempting to mathematically model the dynamics
associated with a natural gas pipeline rupture. This complexity arises due to the
numerous variables involved in the process as well as the varying assumptions made by
previous investigators as to the nature of the physical state of the natural gas during a
rupture condition. In consideration of the above, proposed herein is a simplified
approach for estimating safe separation distances based upon assumptions that the
damage from a pipeline rupture is primarily due to the thermal radiation produced by the
ignited gas behaving like a vertical jet flame, and that the major variables associated with
the burn radii (i.e., impact area) resulting from a pipeline rupture are the size of the
pipeline and its operating pressure (which directly affects the mass flow rate in the
pipeline). The appropriateness of this approach in providing results of an accuracy
suitable for regulatory agencies to utilize for establishing zoning guidelines is confirmed
in this thesis by comparing results from the aforementioned model with actual burn radii
found in a limited number of accident investigations conducted by the NTSB in which
sufficient data was obtained to verify the subject model herein.
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As indicated above, an assumption is made that the damage from a pipeline
rupture is primarily due to the thermal radiation produced by the ignited gas. Therefore, a
safe separation distance is defined as the distance beyond which a pre-established level of
thermal radiation damage will not likely occur. Other damage (such as projectile damage
from pipeline fragments or damage due to overpressures from explosions) is not
considered. This assumption is consistent with the results from investigations of actual
pipeline ruptures, in which damage was found to be caused primarily from the fire.
It was also previously mentioned that the escaping gas is assumed to behave, once
ignited, like a vertical jet flame. A release from a pressurized system like a pipeline can
produce other scenarios such as dispersion of the unignited gas, formation of a fireball,
development of a flash fire or a vapor cloud explosion (20, 31, 34). Furthermore, the
rupture orientation may be such that a flame jet, if it exists, may not be truly vertical.
Assuming that all of the above scenarios can occur increases the number of
variables to be considered, in that the probabilities of each scenario happening (either
alone or in combination with other scenarios) must then be determined. Furthermore,
should these other scenarios occur, there is no certainty that they will contribute
significantly to the overall thermal radiation damage. For example, the dispersion of
unignited gas would not produce thermal radiation damage. Vapor cloud explosions can
produce damage through the generation of pressure waves. However, according to the
Center for Chemical Process Safety (COPS), the following conditions need to be present
for a vapor cloud explosion to occur (34):

J8
The released material must be flammable and at an appropriate temperature and
pressure.
A suitably-sized cloud of the escaping gas must be present before ignition. CCPS
reports that ignition delays of 1 to 5 minutes are the most probable for generating
clouds which can explode.
A sufficient portion of the cloud must be within the flammable range of the
material.
The rate of flame propagation within the cloud determines the severity of blast
effects. High flame speeds can produce high overpressures.
As indicated previously, thermal radiation is the primary cause of damage in natural gas
pipeline ruptures. Since vapor cloud explosions are produced only under a set of very
specific circumstances and since blast effects are not the primary cause of damage, this
scenario is not expected to routinely occur.
With regard to the development of a flash fire, CCPS (34) indicates that very little
information is currently available concerning the thermal radiation produced. CCPS also
states that thermal radiation hazards from burning vapor clouds are considered less
significant than blast effects, and that combustion associated with a flash fire lasts no
more than a few tens of seconds. In addition, Hockey and Rew (32) indicate that for the
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calculation of hazard ranges, it is assumed that people in contact with the flame are fatally
burned while those at a distance would not be seriously affected. It should be noted that
the fire dimensions will depend on the shape of the vapor cloud, which itself is dependent
upon many variables. Given these limitations, the modeling of flash fires for the
determination of safe separation distances is not considered in the dissertation.
Although fireballs are typically associated with BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosions), they can also happen as a result of a pipeline rupture.
CCPS (34) lists the properties of fireballs which have the greatest influence on thermal
radiation. These include:
Fireball diameter as a function of time and maximum diameter;
Height of fireball center above its ignition position as a function of time elapsed
after liftoff;
Fireball surface emissive power; and
Total combustion duration.
Although fireballs produce the highest radiation intensity, these events can be
assumed to last only 10-30 seconds (32). Formulas for fireball diameter, duration and
hazard distances have been published (34) which are functions of the mass of the fuel.
However, in the case of a pipeline rupture the mass of fuel involved in a fireball is
difficult to predict since the release rate varies with time. Due to the limitations and
numerous variables involved, fireball modeling is not attempted in the dissertation.
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In order to model a vertical flame jet emanating from a pipeline rupture, the point
source model will be used. As indicated previously, the point source model was used by
Oenbring, and Sifferman (24) to calculate the heat flux from a flare. Since the damage
incurred by an object receiving radiant heat from a flame is dependent upon the heat flux,
the point source model can be used to relate thermal radiation damage to the distance
from the ruptured pipeline. The model is dependent upon the total heat content of the
escaping gas (which is a function of the gas release rate) and the height of the flame (for
location of the point source). Therefore, the following chapter of the dissertation will
develop relationships for flow rate and flame height which will be used in conjunction
with the point source method for predicting safe separation distances.

CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPMENT OF METHOD TO DETERMINE
SAFE SEPARATION DISTANCES
This chapter presents the methodology which is used to estimate safe separation distances
based on pipeline diameter and incident operating pressure. The equations for
determining heat flux, gas flow rate and flame height are presented and combined to
produce a single safe separation distance equation. This equation is then used in the
preparation of charts for predicting safe separation distances.

4.1 Calculation of Burn Radii
As indicated in Chapter 3, the majority of damage resulting from a pipeline rupture is
caused by thermal radiation. Therefore, the safe separation distance from a pipeline can
be defined in terms of the distance needed to protect against a specified heat flux. This
specified heat flux will produce an area of thermal radiation damage in the vicinity of the
pipeline which can be estimated by calculating the burn radius. In Chapter 3, the
assumption was made that a pipeline rupture produces a vertical jet flame. An
assumption is now made that this vertical flame will radiate equivalently in all directions
so that the burn area will be symmetric about the rupture. The burn area can then be
described by a circle, with the radius of the circle being the burn radius. The following
section describes how the burn radius can be determined using the point source method.
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4.1.1 Use of the Point Source Method
As explained in Chapter 3, the point source method forms the basis for the estimation of

safe separation distances. In Chapter 2, the following equation was presented from the
work of Oenbring and Siffferman (24):
K = FQ/(4πD² ² )

(2-33)

where
K = Radiation heat flux from a flame (Btu/hr ft - )
F = Fraction of total heat radiated
Q = Total heat content of the flared gas (Btu/hr)
D = Distance from point source to receptor (ft)
The authors provide the source for Equation 2-33 as being the American Petroleum
Institute (API) document API RP-521. In a later version of this document (35), API
provides the revised equation:
D = (τFQ/(4πK))¹

/²

(4- 1 )

where
ti

= the fraction of thermal radiation transmitted through the atmosphere
Application of the point source method is shown in Figure 4.1, where ignition of

escaping gas from a pipeline rupture results in a flame of height " H". The point source is
placed in the center of the flame at H/2, and the burn radius (BR) is found from the
Pythagorean Theorem:
²

² 1/²

BR = {D - (H/2) ;

(4-2)
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By inserting Equation 4-1 into Equation 4-2, the following relationship is obtained:
BR = {(τFQ/(4πK)) - (H/2)²} ¹/² (4-3)
This is the basic form of the burn radius equation. The burn radius is function of the
transmissivity of the thermal radiation through the atmosphere, the fraction of total heat
radiated, the heat content of the escaping gas and the specified heat flux (or level of
damage).
Based on information provided by various researchers for methane (20), the value
of F can be reasonably estimated to be 0.2. Furthermore, API (35) discusses the work of
Brzustowsi and Sommer (36) for calculating transmissivity of thermal radiation through
the atmosphere. The authors indicate that t can be found from the following equation:
= 0.79(100/r)

1/16

(100/D)

1/16

(4-4)

where
r = relative humidity, °A
D = distance to flame, feet
The authors caution that Equation 4-4 is "strictly applicable" when the flame is
radiating at a temperature of 2240 ° F, relative humidity is greater than 10%, dry bulb
temperature is 80 ° F and the distance from the flame is greater than 100 feet but less than
500 feet. However, the authors indicate that an "order of magnitude" estimate can be
made under a wider range of conditions. Since the results from pipeline accident
investigations typically show damage extending several hundred feet from the rupture, an
estimate for τ is found by assuming a relative humidity of 50% and a distance to the
flame of 500 feet (both of which are reasonable values):
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τ =

Inserting the values of
becomes:

τ

0.79(100/50)

1/16

(100/500)

1/16

= 0.746

and F into Equation 4-3, the equation for the burn radius

BR = {(0.746(0.2)Q/(4πK)) - (H/2)²{ 1/²
= {(0.011873Q/K) - (H/2)2}

1/²

(4-5)

The total heat content of the escaping gas (Q) in Btu/hr can be found by multiplying the
heat content of natural gas (1,000 Btu/scf) by the volumetric flow rate of the escaping gas
(scf/hr):
Q=1,000(V') (4-6)
where
V' = Volumetric flow rate (scf/hr)
If Equation 4-6 is combined with Equation 4-5, the expression for the burn radius
becomes:
BR = 1(11.8730/ 1 )/K) - (H/2)²}

I/²

The following sections of this chapter will provide discussions of the three variables in
equation 4-7: heat flux (K); gas flow rate (V'); and flame height (H).

4.1.2 Heat Flux Values

Examples of heat flux values corresponding to specific consequences are provided in
Table 4.1. These values were obtained from a review of the literature. A comprehensive
listing of heat flux values can be found in Appendix A.
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Table 4.1
Heat Flux Values
eat Flux Reference
H
Btu/hr ft kW/m²

Number

Consequence

2 2 2**

0.7

37

Unprotected skin becomes red and burns
with prolonged exposure.

317

1

34

Solar heat flux during a hot summer day.

555**

1.75

37

Threshold of pain reached after 60 second
exposure.

634**

2.0

37

Damage to PVC - insulated cables.

2,000

6.5

38

Maximum tolerable heat flux for shortterm (i.e., 20 seconds) exposure for people.

3,994**

12.6

39

Dry, unpainted, wood that is not protected
by shelter is ignited by a small brand or
spark. This is called "piloted ignition".

9,985**

31.5

40

Wooden buildings, paper, window drapes
and trees will spontaneously ignite after a
few minutes exposure.

-

** Calculated using the relationship I Btu/hr ft ² = 3.1546 Watts/square meter (W/m²).

From several of the above examples, it can be seen that the level of thermal
radiation damage may not only depend on the intensity of the heat flux, but also on the
length of time that the receptor is receiving that heat flux. For example, at a heat flux
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intensity of 9,985 Btu/hr ft - , spontaneous ignition of wooden buildings occurs after a
few minutes. At 555 Btu/hr ft ² , the pain threshold is reached after 60 seconds.
Therefore, a safe separation distance will be considered to afford protection from a certain
level of heat flux for a specific time period. If that time period is exceeded, damage may
occur.
In order to estimate a safe separation distance, a level of protection is chosen, such
as protecting wooden buildings from spontaneous ignition for a few minutes. The
corresponding heat flux is found and inserted into Equation 4-7 as the appropriate
K-value. The procedure described in the next section is used to determine an appropriate
gas flow rate.

4.1.3 Determination of Gas Flow Rate
In order to determine the flow rate of gas escaping from a pipeline rupture, a variation of
Equation 2-15 will be used. The use of Equation 2-15 for determining the gas rate from
full bore ruptures is similar to the procedure used by Wilson (11), in which Equation 2-5
(for choked conditions) was used to determine the initial mass release rate from ruptures.
While choked conditions would likewise be expected with high pressure pipeline
punctures and blowdowns, the use of Equation 2-15 provides a convenient means of
estimating gas flow rate knowing only the pipeline diameter and an upstream pressure.
Recall that Equation 2-15, as presented below, is applicable for use during pipeline
punctures and blowdowns:
Q=D ² P i(2-15)
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As described previously, "Q" represents the volume of gas in Mcf/hr at a pressure
of 14.9 psi and 60 ° F with a specific gravity of 0.60. In other words, Q provides the flow
rate at approximately standard conditions. To use Equation 2-15, "D" (the diameter of
the nipple or orifice in inches) is considered to be the nominal diameter of the pipeline for
a worst-case blowdown scenario. Since "P 1 " is the absolute pressure (in psi) at a point
upstream from the opening, this variable will represent the pre-rupture incident operating
pressure at the location of the rupture.
By examining the rate of gas lost through actual pipeline ruptures and comparing
this rate with values obtained using Equation 2-15, an evaluation can be made as to
whether a modifying factor must be applied to Equation 2-15. Table 4.2 presents eight
pipeline accidents investigated and reported upon by the NTSB and the Canadian TSB in
which the following parameters are known: pipeline diameter, incident operating
pressure, rupture isolation time, and volume of gas lost.

Table 4.2
Pipeline Rupture Parameters

Accident
Report
Number

Reference
Number

Incident
Pipeline
Operating
Diameter
Pressure
Inchespsia

P90H0606
83 02
P91H0041
79-FP006
P90H1006
95 01
P941-10036
P94H0003

41
42
43
44
45
3
46
47

12.75
20
20
30
30
36
36
42

-

-

696.7
834.7
933.7
574.7
726.7
984.7
1014.7
1221.7

Isolation
time
hours

Total Volume
of Gas
Lost. scf

2.75
1.42
0.75
2.83
0.58
2.50
0.63
6.67

7
3.78x10
7
4.68x10
6
3.13x10
8
2.01x10
7
8.73x10
8
2.97x10
8
1.48x10
8
3.52x10
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As described in Chapter 2, critical conditions produce the maximum gas flow rate.
Therefore, it will be assumed that, using the incident operating pressure, Equation 2-15
(or Equation 2-15 with a modifying factor) will predict a maximum initial flow rate.
Furthermore, this maximum flow rate will decrease as the pipeline is depressurized. The
maximum flow rate will be identified as VCALC.
.Another flow parameter that can be calculated is the average flow rate, VAVG.
The average flow rate represents the total volume of gas that is lost divided by the time
required to isolate the ruptured pipeline segment. Since VAVG represents an average, or
constant value of flow, the flow rate remains the same from initiation of rupture to
isolation of the pipeline.
VAVG/VCALC.Table 4.3 presents the results of computations of VAVG, V CALL, and the ratio

Table 4.3
Flow Rate Parameters
Accident
Report
VAVG
Numberscf/hr
P90H0606
83-02
P91H0041
79-FP006
P90H1006
95-01
P94H0036
P94H0003

VAVG/VCALC
Ratio

VCALC
scf/hr
7

1.37x10
7
3.30x10
6
4.17x10
7
7.10x10
8
1.51x10
8
1.19x10
8
2.35x10
7
5.28x10

8

1.13x10
8
3.34x10
8
3.73x10
8
5.17x10
6.54x108
9
1.28x10
9
1.32x10
9
2.16x10

0.12
0.10
0.01
0.14
0.23
0.09
0.18
0.02
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For the accidents listed above, V AVG is found to vary between 1% and 23% of
CALC, with an average of 11%. Since during an actual pipeline rupture the initial mass
flow rate will be very high, the flow rate would not be expected to have a value lower
than V A VG• Furthermore, if the assumption is made that the actual flow rate will not be
greater than VCALC, then the actual initial flow rate would be expected to lie between
VAVG and VCALC. Therefore, assume that the initial flow rate is found at the midpoint
between 0.11 VCALC (i.e., V AVG ) and VCALC, which is equal to 0.56 VCALC This
result is very similar to the result found by Wilson and expressed as Equation 2-11, where
the initial mass release rate was found to be 50% of the value found using Equation 2-5
(12).
Inserting the maximum initial flow rate into the point source equation would not
accurately reflect thermal radiation conditions, since the heat flux at a given receptor
location will decrease with the decreasing gas flow. Therefore, assume that a
representative gas flow rate to use in the point source equation exists between 0.56
VCALC and VAVG (or 0.11 VCALC)• The midpoint of this range is 0.34 VCALC, which
then leads to the following equation for determining flow rate:
V'=(1,000)(0.34)D²P (4-8)
where
V'= Gas flow rate, scf/hr
D = Pipeline Diameter, inches
P = Incident Operating Pressure, psia
It should be noted that multiplication by 1,000 in Equation 4-8 converts Mcf/hr to scrim
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By inserting Equation 4-8 into Equation 4-7, the following relationship is
obtained:
BR = {(11.873(1,000)(0.34) D ²P/K) - (H/2) ² }
= {(4,036.82) D ² P/K) - (H/2)² ¹/² -H/2²}¹/² (4-9)
The burn radius is now expressed as a function of the pipeline diameter, operating
pressure, heat flux and the flame height. In the next section of this chapter, an expression
for the flame height will be developed which can be inserted into Equation 4-9.

4.1.4 Determination of Flame Height
In a manner similar to the method for determining the expression for gas flow rate, the
information obtained from actual pipeline accidents can be used to estimate flame height.
Recalling the Hawthorne Equation that was provided in Chapter 2:
L/D = (5.3/CT){(TF/(aTTN))(CT+(1-CT)(Ms/MN)}¹/²

(2-16)

where, in dimensions of mass (M), length (L), time (t) and temperature (T), the various
terms are:
L = visible flame length (L)
D = nozzle diameter (L)
TF = adiabatic flame temperature (absolute T)
TN = temperature of nozzle fluid (absolute T)
Ms = molecular weight of surrounding fluid (unitless)
MN= molecular weight of nozzle fluid (unitless)
CT = mol fraction of nozzle fluid in the unreacted stoichiometric mixture (decimal)
αT= mols of reactants/mols products for the stoichiometric mixture (decimal)
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Equation 2-16 is applicable to vertical flame jets in still air. Since the assumption was
made that the flame jet from a pipeline rupture will be vertical, the equation can be used
in the evaluation of flame height.
Using the values of CT = 0.091, αT = 1 and T F /TN = 7.4 for methane (20) in
Equation 2-16, along with a molecular weight of 29.0 (48) for air and a molecular weight
of 16.042 for methane (8), the following expression is obtained:
L/D = (5.310.091){(7.411)(0.091+(1-0.091)(29.0/16.042))}1/2
(4-10)

= 208.6

Therefore, for a given gas, the flame length is directly proportional to the jet (or
nozzle) diameter. This observation can be applied to the NTSB pipeline accident data,
where estimation of flame heights are provided. If the assumption is made that the jet
diameter is equal to the pipeline diameter for a full bore rupture, the following is
obtained:

Table 4.4
Flame Height Data
Accident
Report
Number
86-009
95-01
77-01
71-01
87-01

Reference
Number

Diameter
(D)
Inches

Diameter
(D/12)
Feet

Reported Flame
Height
H/(D/12)
(H). Feet

49
3
50
51
2

20
36
20
14
30

1.67
3.00
1.67
1.17
2.50

300
450
200
125
450

180
150
120
107
180
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The average H/(D/12) is 147, so assume that this ratio can be used to estimate
flame height. Therefore, the following relationship is obtained:
H=147(D/12)
(4-1 I )

=12.25(D)
where
D = Pipeline diameter (in)

While it is understood that the calculated L/D value (208.6) is of a similar order of
magnitude to the average H/D value (147), it is this average HID value that will be used
in subsequent calculations. This is justified since the original work of Hawthorne (21)
used small diameter nozzles to produce the jet instead of full pipeline diameters.
By inserting equation 4-11 into Equation 4-9, the final burn radius equation is
found:
BR = {(4,036.8?)

D²P/K) (1,).25D0)²}1/²

= D{(4,036.82)P/K) - 37.52}
where
BR = Burn Radius (ft)
D = Pipeline Diameter (in)
P = Incident operating pressure (psia)
K = Heat flux (Btu/hr ft²)

1/²

(4-12)
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Equation 4-12 provides a means by which the burn radius (and hence the safe
separation distance) can be found knowing only the pipeline diameter, incident operating
pressure and the level of damage (i.e., heat flux) to be considered. Since pipeline
operating pressures are typically specified as gauge pressures, Equation 4-12 can be
modified for application to gauge pressures by substituting the quantity (P' + 14.7) for P,
where P' is the incident operating pressure in prig.
Using Equation 4-12, charts can be developed for estimating the burn radius. The
method for constructing these charts is presented in the next section.

4.1.5 Construction of Charts to Predict Safe Separation Distances
The following procedure is used to construct charts for the rapid estimation of safe
separation distances. The first step involves deciding what degree of thermal radiation
damage to consider. For example, the damage might be spontaneous ignition of wooden
buildings after a few minutes exposure to the ignited gas. Protection for a few minutes
may allow enough time for emergency responders to arrive at the scene and initiate
protective measures (such as watering down the buildings). Based on the information in
both Appendix A and Table 4, the heat flux corresponding to the specified level of
²

damage is 9,985 Btu/hr t . This value is inserted into Equation 4-12 for K:
BR= D{(4,036.82)P/9,985) - 37.521

1/²

(4 13)
-

Equation 4-13 is an expression of the burn radius as a function of only diameter and
incident operating pressure. For various pipeline diameters, graphs are then constructed
of the burn radius (on the y-axis) and the incident operating pressure (on the x-axis). In
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Figure 4.2 - Example of a Burn Radius Chart for a 36"
Diameter Pipeline, K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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the example, a pipeline diameter of 36" can be used with incident operating pressures in
the range of 575 psia to 1,200 psia to construct a chart similar to the one shown in Figure
4.2. Once the graph is completed, it can be used either to determine a safe separation
distance given a specified incident operating pressure, or to determine the incident
operating pressure required to maintain a specified safe separation distance.
Charts for estimating safe separation distances (or burn radii) are provided in
Appendix B for heat fluxes (from Appendix A) of 3,962 Btu/hr ft (piloted ignition of
-

wood); 6,340 Btu/hr ft (blistering of bare skin in 4 seconds and 1 % lethality in 20
-

seconds); 9,510 Btu/hr² ft (causes third degree burns in 30 seconds); and 9,985 Btu/hr ft²
(spontaneous ignition of wooden structures after a few minutes). The charts have been
developed for pipeline diameters of 14", 16", 18", 20", 24", 30" and 36", with incident
operating pressures in the range of 575 psia to 1,200 psia. It should be noted that the
charts do not consider that portion of the heat flux due to solar radiation. An accurate
value of the solar heat flux would be dependent on factors such as the weather conditions,
the time of day and the time of year. Since the solar heat flux amounts to only a few
hundred Btu/hr ft while the non-solar heat flux is several thousand Btu/hr ft ² , omission
-

of this factor will not significantly affect the results.
Equation 4-12 will be used in the next chapter for comparing (for verification
purposes) predicted values of burn radii using the model developed herein to information
from actual pipeline accidents and to the results of prior research.

CHAPTER 5
COMPARISON OF METHOD TO PIPELINE ACCIDENT DATA
AND TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The previous chapter presented Equation 4-12 as a means by which a burn radius can be
determined through knowledge of a pipelines's diameter, incident operating pressure and
the level of thermal radiation damage. In this chapter, the utilization of Equation 4-12
will be evaluated by first comparing the results it produces to data from two highly
documented pipeline accidents that occurred in the United States. These accidents
(located in Edison, New Jersey and Lancaster, Kentucky) were selected for this detailed
analysis since these were the only two accidents for which extensive descriptions of the
thermal radiation damage could be obtained from the NTSB. Additionally, an attempt is
made to compare the results from Equation 4-12 with other pipeline accidents in which
less extensive information is reported.
The second part of this chapter will compare the results of Equation 4-12 to
separation distance calculations that have been developed by other countries (i.e., Great
Britain and the Netherlands) through the use of the principles of hazard analysis.
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5.1 Comparison to Pipeline Accident Data
This section provides a comparison of burn radii obtained from actual pipeline rupture
events to corresponding estimates developed through use of Equation 4-12. Since review
-

of the pipeline accident information reveals that burn patterns are not truly symmetric
(due to numerous factors including variation in wind velocity and direction during a
rupture condition), the actual burn radii will be defined conservatively as the farthest
horizontal distance from the rupture at which the specified level of thermal radiation
damage is observed. Since the point source method assumes a circular (i.e. symmetric)
burn pattern around the rupture, there may be locations around the rupture for which
Equation 4-12 overestimates the extent of thermal radiation damage based upon the above
noted assumption. However, comparison of the results obtained from Equation 4-12 to
the maximum horizontal burn distances is an approach which provides a level of
confidence that the estimated burn radii should approximate, and not be significantly less
than, the actual burn radii (which would be undesirable in actual practice).
The following section evaluates the damage produced by the pipeline rupture
which occurred in Edison, New Jersey, on March 23, 1994.

5.1.1 PAR 95-01
This Pipeline Accident Report (3) describes the rupture of a 36 inch natural gas
transmission pipeline owned and operated by the Texas Eastern Transmission
Corporation. The rupture occurred at approximately I 1:55 p.m. on March 23, 1994, on
the property of Quality Materials, Inc. in Edison, New Jersey. Ignition of the escaping

Figure 5.1 - Location of Edison, New Jersey Accident
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gas occurred within 2 minutes after the rupture, producing flames 400 to 500 feet high.
While no deaths were directly attributed to the accident, the rupture produced extensive
damage including the destruction of several buildings of a nearby apartment complex.
The total cost of the damage exceeded 25 million dollars. The NTSB determined that the
probable cause of the rupture was mechanical damage to the exterior pipeline surface.
The damage reduced the pipeline wall thickness and probably resulted in a crack that
grew to a critical size.
The accident location is shown in a copy of the aerial photograph presented as
Figure 5.1. This photograph (without the "+" symbol) was obtained from the NTSB
(C. Batten: personal communication, February 1996), and was taken on March 30, 1994.
In the photograph, north is approximately located to the upper right, and the location of

the rupture is identified with the "+" symbol. The Durham Woods Apartments (i.e., the
apartment complex which received significant damage) are located in the lower right of
the photograph. An enlarged portion of this photograph depicts the rupture location
(without the "+" symbol) and the Durham Woods Apartments, and is presented in
Appendix C as Figure C.1. Another figure is provided (see Figure C.2) which is based on
a sketch obtained from the NTSB (C. Batten: personal communication, February 1996)
identifying the various buildings in the apartment complex.
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As indicated previously. the rupture occurred at approximately 11:55 p.m., with
ignition of the gas less than two minutes later. According to the PAR, the Edison
Township Fire Department arrived at the accident scene at approximately 12:02 a.m. At
that time, building number 12 was "fully involved" in fire, and the three buildings
adjacent to it were quickly becoming involved. These are buildings numbered 9, 10 and
11 as shown on Figure C.2. Based on a discussion with Edison Township (personal
communication, February 1996), buildings numbered 11, 12 and 24 were involved in fire
upon arrival of the Fire Department, and buildings numbered 7, 8, 16, 19, 23 and 25
would have burned if these structures were not wetted down (it should be noted that
buildings numbered 20, 21 and 22 were also destroyed by the accident).
If the buildings were set back from the rupture at a distance beyond the location of
buildings 9, 10, 11, 12 and 24 (i.e., those buildings which were apparently involved in
fire after a few minutes exposure to thermal radiation), then this distance would have
provided protection for a few minutes from spontaneous ignition. This distance can be
estimated using Equation 4-12, and verified by comparing the calculated burn radius to
the actual location of the damage. However, since an appropriate scale could not be
obtained for Figure C.1 (since a scale was not provided with Figure 5.1), a scale for this
figure must first be developed.

59
Figure C.3 is an illustration of a portion of the accident location, and is based on a
diagram that was likewise obtained from the ?TSB (C. Batten: personal communication,
February 1996). Using the existing scale on this figure, a landmark is selected which is
clearly defined in both Figure C.3 and Figure C.1 and which can be used for scale
comparison. The landmark chosen is the north-south length of buildings numbered 21,
22 and 23 (which have similar lengths). Using the scale on Figure C.3, the length of
these buildings is approximately 158 feet. The length of the image of building number 23
on the author's original Figure C.1 is 0.625 inches. Therefore, the scale for Figure C.1 is
158 feet per 0.625 inches, or 253 feet per inch. The white bar at the bottom of Figure C.1
represents a length of 253 feet.
In order to use Equation 4-12, an appropriate heat flux must first be selected.
Since the concern is protecting structures from spontaneous ignition for several minutes,
²

a heat flux of 9,985 Btu/hr ft from Appendix A will be selected. Inserting this value for
heat flux into Equation 4-12, as well as the pipeline diameter of 36 inches and the
incident operating pressure of 984.7 psia, the burn radius becomes:
BR = 36{[(4,036.82)(984.7)/(9,985)] - 37.52;

1/2

= 684 feet
On Figure C.1, the distance from the rupture (taken as the midpoint of the open space
between the two exposed ends of pipeline, or the center of the "+" symbol on Figure 5.1)
and the approximate midpoint of the footprint for building number 9 (i.e., the building
farthest from the rupture that was becoming involved in fire when the Fire Department
arrived) is 772 feet. The estimated burn radius differs from the actual burn radius by less
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than 12 percent. It can therefore be seen that the predicted burn radius does in fact
approximate the distance to those buildings which were involved in fire a few minutes
after the rupture.
A burn radius can likewise be estimated for determining the distance beyond
which buildings will not ignite at all. For the Edison accident, this distance would extend
beyond the location of those buildings which were wetted down. in order to predict the
distance with Equation 4-12, a heat flux of 3,962 Btu/hr ft ² is selected From Appendix A.
This is the heat flux at which piloted ignition of wood occurs, so below this heat flux
wood is not expected to ignite. From Equation 4-12, the bum radius becomes:
BR = 36{[(4,036.82)(984.7)/(3,962)] - 37.52}

1/²

1,119 feet
Using the same scale as before, the distance from the rupture point to the midpoint
of building number 25 (i.e., the building farthest from the rupture that was wetted down)
is 1,101 feet. The predicted burn radius is therefore very similar to the actual distance
determined from Figure C.1, with a difference of less than 2 percent.
The above analysis has shown that Equation 4-12 provides a good estimation of
burn radii for the Edison, New Jersey accident. The next section presents an analysis of
the damage associated with an accident that occurred near Lancaster, Kentucky.

Figure 5.2 - Location of Lancaster, Kentucky Accident
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5.1.2 PAR 87-01
The accident described in this PAR (2) involves the rupture of a 30-inch diameter
pipeline owned by the Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Company. The rupture and fire, which
occurred near Lancaster, Kentucky, injured eight persons and resulted in $500,000
damage to property adjacent to the pipeline. A depiction of the accident scene
(reproduced from the PAR) is presented in Figure 5.2. The NTSB identified the probable
cause of the accident as being the failure of the Texas Eastern Gas Pipeline Company to
perform a comprehensive investigation of detected corrosion damage and to repair this
damage.
The PAR indicates that the rupture occurred at 2:05 a.m. Based on the transcript
of a hearing conducted by the NTSB (52), emergency responders arrived at the scene at
2:07 a.m and found that the area beginning at the Fletcher's trailer and extending to the
structures behind the Henderson's home was involved in fire (see Figure 5.2).
Specifically, during the aforementioned hearing, Mr. Mike Murphy of the Garrod County
Disaster and Emergency Services states that upon arrival at the accident scene:
The area from approximately the Fletcher's House Trailer back through this area,
around the cross - - we could see quite easily that the Maggard Home was
involved, that the Henderson Home was involved, the barns back in this area. So,
basically, a large ball of fire in the area that was mentioned, however, there was a
tremendous amount of exposure type fire from the other buildings that we have
talked about - - the barn. There was a significant amount of grass in the area on
fire."
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In a manner similar to that used for the Edison, New Jersey accident, a burn radius
can be estimated using a heat flux of 9,985 Btu/hr ft ² , since structures were ignited a few
minutes after the rupture. Inserting this value once again into Equation 4-12, with the
pipeline diameter of 30 inches and the incident operating pressure of 1001.7 psia, the
burn radius becomes:
BR = 30{[(4,036.82)(1,001.7)/(9,985)] - 37.52¹/²

1/²

-- 575 feet
Although Figure 5.2 does not have a scale, a scale can be determined using the
276 foot distance identified on the figure which corresponds to the distance from the
rupture to the Henderson's house. On the original figure in the PAR, the 276 foot
distance corresponds to 1.675 inches. Therefore, the appropriate scale is 276 feet per
1.675 inches, or 165 feet per inch. The black line in the lower right of Figure 5.2
represents this 165 foot length. Using this scale, the distance from the rupture to the
midpoint of the footprint of the burned barn (i.e., the structure farthest from the rupture
which was presumably burning a few minutes after the rupture) is 585 feet. The
difference in the calculated versus the actual burn radius is less than 2 percent. As with
the New Jersey accident, the predicted burn radius corresponds closely to the actual
damage that was observed.
The information obtained for this accident is also sufficient for comparing burn
radii estimated with Equation 4-12 to distances resulting in injuries to people. Based on
the information provided in the hearing transcript (52), Mr. and Mrs. Henderson
experienced second and third degree burns while their 12 year old daughter suffered
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second degree burns. The Hendersons escaped from the scene of the rupture by leaving
their house through the back door, running through a field and over a bank at the river
cliff' where the heat flux was low enough to allow them to rest.
Predicting the burn radii corresponding to a specific level of injury is more
complex than predicting the distance for structural damage. Unlike structures, people can
escape from the scene of a rupture and consequently experience heat fluxes which
decrease with time and distance. Furthermore, escape velocities (i.e., the speed at which
people run from the rupture) can vary as well as the level of clothing which the affected
people are wearing (32). Although the exact path that the Henderson's took to escape is
unknown, and the level of clothing they wore was not available in the information that
was reviewed, it is known that they experienced a specific level of injury (i.e. second and
third degree burns).
Using the specifications of the ruptured pipeline, one can show that Equation 4-12
predicts the occurrence of second and third degree burns to persons fleeing directly away
from the rupture. First, a representative escape velocity must be determined. Hockey and
Rew (32) provide escape velocities of 1 m/s (3.28 ft/s), 2.5 m/s (8.2 ft/s), 4 m/s (13.1 ft/s)
and 6 m/s (19.69 ft/s). A representative escape velocity is considered to be 2.5 m/s (8.2
ft/s), which would reasonably be expected since people are fleeing the fire in the early
morning hours after being asleep. Furthermore, it is assumed that the house provides
shelter from the thermal radiation for the time in which the residents react to the accident
(i.e., several seconds). From Figure 5.2, if a person exits from the rear of the Henderson's
house (and, from Figure 5.2, knowing that the house is approximately 29 feet wide), that
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person will be approximately 276 + 29 = 305 feet from the rupture when first exposed to
thermal radiation outside the house. After the first second, the person will be
305 + 8.2 = 313.2 feet from the rupture; after two seconds the separation distance
increases to 305 + 2(8.2) = 321.4 feet, and so on. Equation 4-12 can be rewritten as
follows in order to express heat flux as a function of separation distance, pipeline
diameter and incident operating pressure:
K = 4036.82(P)/RBR ² /D ² ) + 37.52]

(5-1)

Through use of Equation 5-1, the relationship of incident heat flux to exposure
time can be examined for this accident. Furthermore, the following equation from
Appendix A can be used for determining the average heat flux which will result in severe
blistering:

= 50/t c

0.71

(5-2)

where:
²

= Average heat flux (kW/m )
t o = Duration of exposure (seconds)
Table 5.1 provides the incident heat flux experienced over the first thirty seconds
by a person fleeing the Lancaster, Kentucky rupture.
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Table 5.1
Heat Flux Experienced at Lancaster, Kentucky Accident
Time
Seconds

Distance from
Rupture. feet

7
Heat Flux - Btu/hr ft
Equation 5-2*
Equation 5-1

0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30

305
321.4
337.8
354.2
370.6
387.0
403.4
419.8
436.2
452.6
469.0
485.4
501.9
518.3
534.7
551.1

28,703
26,552
24,610
22,856
21,269
19,829
18,521
17,330
16,244
15,252
14,343
13,510
12,740
12,035
11,385
10,784

--

²
* Values converted from kW/m² using the relationship 1 Btu/hr ft

9,689
5,923
4,442
3,621
3,090
2,715
2,434
2,214
2,036
1,889
1,766
1,660
1,568
1,488
1,417
= 3.1546 kW/m²

In Figure C.4 the information from Table 5.1 is plotted on the chart of heat flux
versus exposure time. It can be seen that at all times considered, the estimated heat flux
(calculated from Equation 5-1) is greater than the average heat flux necessary to cause
severe blistering. Therefore, Equation 5-1 correctly predicts that persons fleeing the
rupture will suffer at least second degree burns. Furthermore, it was previously
mentioned that a heat flux of 9,510 Btu/hr ft ²will cause third degree burns in 30 seconds.
Equation 5-1 predicts that, at an escape velocity of 8.2 ft/s, third degree burns should
occur since the estimated heat flux is larger than 9,510 Btu/hr ft ² . As documented by the
NTSB, Mr. and Mrs. Henderson suffered both second and third degree burns.
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While the available damage information from other pipeline accidents is not as
extensive as for the two pipeline accidents that have been considered, the following
section compares the available burn radii information to the estimates produced by
Equation 4-12.

5.1.3 Other Data
While the information that was reviewed for the following accidents is not as detailed as
the information obtained for the two accidents described above, burn radii estimated with
Equation 4-12 are compared to the approximate burn radii that are based on the available
damage information from other accidents documented by the NTSB. It should be noted
that the following specific accidents were selected for comparison since a sufficient
amount information is available to approximate burn radii and the incident operating
pressures and pipeline diameters are within the ranges of Equation 4-12 (i.e., 575 to 1,200
psia and 14 inches to 36 inches in diameter).
1.

PAR 71-01 (51) - Houston, Texas - September 9, 1969: This accident involved
the rupture of a 14 inch pipeline at a pressure of approximately 789 psig (803.7
psia). Figure 2 in the PAR indicates that the roof of a house 300 feet from the
rupture was scorched. In a manner similar to the analysis performed for the
Edison, New Jersey accident, a heat flux of 3,962 Btu/hr ft² can be used to
estimate the distance beyond which structures will not ignite. Using Equation
4-12, the burn radius becomes:
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BR = 14{[(4,036.82)(803.7)/(3,962)] - 37.521

1/²

= 391 feet
The estimated burn radius represents a difference of 30 percent from the actual
value.
2.

PAR 75-02 (53) - Bealeton, Virginia - June 9, 1974: The accident, which
involved the rupture of a 30 inch pipeline operating at 718 psig (732.7 psia),
produced a burn area 700 feet long and 400 feet wide. Figure 4 of the PAR
indicates that the burn area was not symmetrical, but rather downstream of the
rupture. Therefore, the actual burn radius will be considered to be 700 feet. The
estimated burn radius is found as follows, using Equation 4-12 with a heat flux of
²

ft²

3,962 Btu/hr ft (i.e. the heat flux for piloted ignition of wood, which is assumed
to be the heat flux associated with the extent of a burn area):
BR = 30 { [(4,036.82)(732.7)/(3,962)] - 37.521

1/²

= 799 feet
This value represents a difference of 14 percent from the actual value.
3.

PAR 77-01 (50) - Cartwright, Louisianna - August 9, 1976: The rupture of a
20-inch pipe operating at 770 psig (784.7 psia) resulted in a burn area of
approximately 12 acres. It is unclear from the information that was reviewed
whether or not the burn area was symmetric. Figure 2 of the PAR indicates
damage surrounding the pipeline. Complicating matters is the fact that horizontal
flames vented from the rupture for a distance of 100 to 150 feet. If a symmetric
burn area is considered, then a burn radius can be found by first calculating the
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total burn area in square feet . Since one acre represents 43,560 square feet, the
total burn area is 12(43,560) = 522,720 ft ² . From the equation for the area of a
circle (i.e., area = π [ rad ius]² ) , the actual burn radius becomes:
BR = (522,720/70

1/²

= 408 feet

By comparison, use of Equation 4-12 with a heat flux of 3962 Btu/hr ft - produces
the following:
BR = 201[(4,036.82)(784.7)/(3,962)] - 37.52}

i/²

= 552 feet
For this accident, the estimated burn radius differs from the actual value by 35
percent.
4.

DCA-85-FP-003 (54) - Jacksonville, Louisianna - November 25, 1984: The
pipeline involved in this accident had a diameter of 30 inches and was operating at
1,016 psig (1,030.7 psia). A non-symmetrical damage area was produced, with
the rupture incinerating an area 900 feet north, 500 feet south and 180 feet to the
east and west of the rupture. If the burn radius is considered to be the maximum
linear distance from the rupture to the edge of the incinerated area, the radius is
then 900 feet. Again, using Equation 4-12 and a heat flux of 3,962 Btu/hr ft ² , the
estimated burn radius becomes:
BR 30{[(4,036.82)(1030.7)/(3,962)] - 37.521

1/2

= 955 feet
The estimated burn radius differs from the actual burn radius by only 6 percent.
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5.

DCA-86-FP-009 (49) - Cale, Arkansas - February 24, 1986: The information
available for this accident indicates that a 20 inch pipeline operating at 750 psig
(764.7 psia) ruptured and resulted in a burn area of 15 acres. Since 1 acre is
equivalent to 43,560 ft - , the burn area (in square feet) is 15(43,560) = 653,400 ft - .
Since details of the actual burn shape were not available, a circular burn patten is
considered, and the actual burn radius becomes (using the equation for the area of
a circle):
BR = (653,400/70

1/²

= 456 feet

²

Using a heat flux of 3,962 Btu/hr ft , Equation 4-12 estimates the burn radius to
be:
BR = 20{[(4,036.82)(764.7)/(3,962)] - 37.52;

1 /²

= 545 feet
The difference in actual versus estimated values is approximately 20 percent.
6.

PAR 87-01 (2) - Beaumont, Kentucky - April 27, 1985: This accident
(described in the same report as the Lancaster, Kentucky accident) involved the
rupture of a 30 inch diameter pipeline operating at 990 psig (1,004.7 psia). The
accident incinerated an area 700 feet long and 500 feet wide. From Figure 3 in
the PAR, the burn area is not truly symmetric; rather, the longest dimension from
the rupture is approximately 500 feet. If this dimension is considered the actual
burn radius, then the estimated burn radius is:

70
BR = 30{[(4,036.82)(1,004.7)/(3,962)] - 37.521 11²
= 942 feet.
This estimation represents the largest difference observed between predicted and
actual burn radii, with a value of 88 percent.

5.2 Comparison to Separation Distances Developed through Hazard Analysis
5.2.1 Separation Distances Imposed in the Dutch Regulations
Earlier chapters discussed the Dutch regulations and the two types of separation distances
that have been developed. The following discussion is based on personal
communications from Hans van Poelje of N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie dated November 30,
1995; June 21, 1996; and September 30, 1996. The first type of separation distance is
called a proximity, or building distance. This is the distance between a pipeline and
6i
residential buildings (or special structures) and corresponds to a 10 individual risk. The
second type of distance is called a survey, or effect distance. This distance is determined
for the purpose of identifying the location classification and corresponds to a 10

-8

individual risk.
Based upon the available information, the building distances imposed in the
Dutch regulations can be compared to distances that are estimated through use of
Equation 4-12. However, since Equation 4-12 was not developed using risk assessment
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techniques, a basis for comparison must first be selected. For comparison to building
distances, Equation 4-12 will use as a basis a heat flux of 9,985 Btu/hr ft ² . As was shown
earlier in this chapter, this level of thermal radiation results in the destruction of buildings
after a few minutes exposure.
The Dutch regulations specify three ranges of operating pressures (20 to 50 bar;
50 to 80 bar; and 80 to 110 bar) and pipeline diameters from 2 inches to 48 inches. In
order to provide a meaningful comparison, the range of pipeline diameters and pressures
used in the development of Equation 4-12 will be evaluated (i.e., diameters from 14 to 36
inches and pressures from 575 to 1,200 psia). By converting the Dutch pressure ranges
from bar to psia (by using the relationship 1.01325 bar equals 14.696 psia, and converting
gauge to absolute pressure), the pressure ranges become: 304.8 to 739.9 psia; 739.9 to
1,175.0 psia; and 1,175.0 to 1,610.1 psia. Although the midpoints of these ranges are
approximately 522.3 psia, 957.4 psia, and 1,392.6 psia, the three pressures which will be
used in Equation 4-12 are 522.3 psia; 957.4 psia and 1,200.0 psia. The pressure of
1,200.0 psia is used in lieu of 1,392.6 psia since 1,200.0 psia represents the upper limit of
pressure used to develop Equation 4-12, yet still lies within the third range.
The comparisons are presented in Table C.1 of Appendix C. It can be seen that
Equation 4-12 estimates significantly larger separation distances than the building
distances determined by the Dutch. However, as shown through the analyses of the
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Edison, New Jersey and Lancaster, Kentucky accidents, the building distances developed
by the Dutch will not be protective of structures. For a 36-inch diameter pipeline, the
maximum building distance is 148 feet. This distance would clearly not have been
protective of structures for the two aforementioned accidents.
Although the building distances and burn radii do not correspond, the trends in
both at conditions of constant pressure (with varying diameter) and constant diameter
(with varying pressure) do correspond closely. If pressure is held constant, then the
following ratio is produced when using Equation 4-12:
BR1/BR2

²

= [D I {(4,036.82)P/K) - 37.52; ¹/²]/D2 {(4,036.82)P/K) - 37.52}

1/²

=D1/D2 (5-3)
If diameters are held constant, then Equation 4-12 produces the following ratios:
BR 1 /BR2 = [D{(4,036.82)P 1 /K) - 37.521

1/²

]/{D {(4,036.82)P2/K) 37.52}

= [4((4,036.82)P1/K) - 37.52/{((4,036.82)NK) - 37.52}}

1/7

1/²

1

(5-4)

Tables C.2 and C.3 of Appendix C present the comparison of building distances for
constant pressure and diameter. It can be seen that both the Dutch approach and Equation
4-12 produce very similar trends (i.e. similar ratios) whether conditions of constant
pressure or constant diameter are evaluated.
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5.2.2 Separation Distances Determined by the British Health and Safety Executive
Hill and Catmur performed a study for the British Health and Safety Executive (31) to
evaluate how risks from various hazardous pipelines compared. As part of the above
study, distances from a vertical flame jet to a heat flux level of 10 kW/m ²
(3,170 Btu/hr ft ) are provided for the pipelines under consideration. The authors
-

simulated the flame jet as an inclined line source with a receptor 1.5 meters (4.92 feet)
high at ground level. Furthermore, the authors indicate that the model which was used

provides the maximum view factor between the source and receptor, with the thermal
radiation being a function of the flame's emissivity, the transmissivity of the air, the view
factor and the radiant energy of the burning compound.
A comparison can be made between those distances and the distances estimated
using Equation 4-12. This comparison is presented in Table 5.2, for pipelines with
diameters within the range of 14 inches to 36 inches, and operating pressures within the
range from 500 psia to 1,200 psia:

Table 5.2
Comparison of Health and Safety Executive Results with Equation 4-12
Pipeline
Diameter
Inches

Barg

Psia

Separation Distances-Feet
Equation 4-12
British*

24
16

70
70

1030.0
1030.0

820
564

Pressure

857
571

* Converted from meters using the relationship 1 meter equals 3.2808 feet.

Percent
Difference
4.5
1.2
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The separation distances found from Equation 4-12 agree very closely with those
predicted by Hill and Catmur. If the ranges of diameters and pressures is extended to
include all of the natural gas pipelines in the study, the comparison in Table 5.3 is
obtained:

Table 5.3
Comparison of all Natural Gas Pipelines
Pipeline
Diameter
Inches

Pressure
Barg
Psia

Separation Distances-Feet Percent
Equation 4-12 Difference
British*

42
24
16
6
24
24
6
6

70
70
70
70
16
7
16
7

1,385
820
564
226
443
351
138
95

1030.0
1030.0
1030.0
1030.0
246.8
116.2
246.8
116.2

1,499
857
571
214
399
252
100
63

8.2
4.5
1.2
5.3
9.9
28.7
27.5
33.7

* Converted from meters using the relationship 1 meter equals 3.2808 feet.

It can be seen that even outside the range of diameters and pressures for which
Equation 4-12 was developed that this relationship still produces results which
approximate those of the British. The higher percent differences reflected in the last three
entries of Table 5.3 are probably due to the use of low operating pressures, either singly
or in combination with small diameters, which are outside the range for which Equation
4-12 was developed.
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In summary, the analyses performed in this chapter have shown that the
methodology developed in this thesis can be used to provide estimations of burn radii
which are consistent with the burn radii determined for those accidents reported upon by
the NTSB where there is ample documentation to conduct an analysis using the approach
developed herein. Additionally, this methodology produces results consistent with the
work published by the British Health and Safety Executive. While the burn radii
estimated with Equation 4-12 are not similar to the building distances developed by the
Dutch, it is clear from analyses performed in this chapter that the distances developed by
the Dutch would not be protective of buildings. However, the trends in both the building
distances and the distances estimated with Equation 4-12 (i.e., the variation of distance
with both pressure and diameter) are found to be very consistent.
The next chapter provides additional evaluation of the methodology developed in
this thesis. Specifically, an analysis will be performed in which the sensitivity of the burn
radius is evaluated based on variations of the assumptions stated in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 6
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The previous chapters have described the work that was performed for this thesis. This
work included the development and testing of a relationship for the estimation of burn
radii based on a pipeline's diameter and incident operating pressure. Consequently, the
primary result of this thesis is Equation 4-12:
BR = D{(4,036.82)P/K) - 37.521

1/²

(4-12)

where
BR = Burn Radius (ft)
D = Pipeline Diameter (in)
P = Incident operating pressure (psia)
K = Heat flux (Btu/hr ft`)
Through the use of Equation 4-12, charts have been developed which can be used
to estimate burn radii. These charts are provided in Appendix B for heat flux values
(listed in Appendix A) of 3,962 Btu/hr tt (piloted ignition of wood); 6,340 Btu/hr ft ²
(blistering of bare skin in 4 seconds and 1 % lethality in 20 seconds); 9,510 Btu/hr ft
(causes third degree burns in 30 seconds); and 9,985 Btu/hr ft ²(spontaneous ignition of
wooden structures after a few minutes). Equation 4-12 and the charts in Appendix B are
applicable to natural gas pipelines with diameters ranging from 14 inches to 36 inches
and incident operating pressures in the range of 575 psia to 1,200 psia. The above ranges
of diameters and pressures are applicable to most major natural gas transmission pipelines
operating in the United States.
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In Chapter 5, the sensitivity of Equation 4-12 to changes in pressure (at constant
diameter) and to changes in diameter (at constant pressure) was discussed in relation to
the work performed by the Dutch. In this chapter, an analysis will be performed to
evaluate the sensitivity of Equation 4-12 to variations in heat flux. Furthermore, this
analysis will be expanded to include the effects of variations in atmospheric
transmissivity, wind direction and wind speed on the estimation of the burn radius.

6.1 Effect of Variation in Heat Flux on Burn Radius
Selection of an appropriate heat flux for use in Equation 4-12 is critical in the estimation
of an appropriate burn radius. It is therefore worthwhile to evaluate the effect that a
variation in heat flux can have on the burn radius. Equation 4-12 was developed for use
with natural gas pipelines having diameters from 14 inches to 36 inches and incident
operating pressures from 575 psia to 1,200 psia; therefore, the following conditions
(which span the range of diameters and pressures) will be used in the analysis:

Table 6.1
Pipeline Conditions
Pipeline Diameter

Incident Operating Pressure

14 Inches
14 Inches
36 Inches
36 Inches

575 psia
1,200 psia
575 psia
1,200 psia
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In addition, since heat flux values from 3,962 Btu/hr ft" to 9,985 Btu/hr ft - were shown
in Chapter 5 to provide results (i.e., burn radii estimates) similar to those observed during
actual pipeline ruptures, the analysis will be limited to values within this range.
Through use of Equation 4-12, burn radii are estimated for each of the pipeline
conditions specified in Table 6.1, at the following heat flux levels: 3,962 Btu/hr ft ² ; 6,340
Btu/hr ft ² ; 9,510 Btu/hr ft² ; and 9,985 Btu/hr ft - . Table 6.2 provides a tabularrepresentation of this information.

Table 6.2
Burn Radii at Various Heat Fluxes
Heat Flux
²
Btu/hr ft

Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
36"/1,200 psia
36"/575 psia
14"/575psia 14"/1.200 psia

3,962
6,340
9,510
9,985

328
254
201
195

482
377
304
296

843
653
517
503

1,239
970
782
762

From the above results, it can be seen that the burn radius varies from a minimum
of 195 feet to a maximum of 1,239 feet. The variation of burn radius with heat flux is
evident from the columns of Table 6.2, which illustrate the decrease in burn radius with
increasing heat flux for each of the four pipeline conditions. The use of Equation 4-12
necessitates the selection of a single value of heat flux, which is presumed to be
associated with a specific level of thermal radiation damage. However, from the heat flux
information presented in Appendix A, it can be seen that a range of heat flux values could
be associated with a particular level of damage. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine
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the effect that a variation in heat flux has on the estimated burn radius. Table 6.3
provides the results of burn radius calculations for each of the four heat flux values of
Table 6.2, in which each of the heat flux values is varied (i.e., increased and decreased)
by 25 percent. This amount of variation is consistent with the variation of heat flux
values in Appendix A, for a specified level of thermal radiation damage.

Table 6.3
Variation of Heat Flux Values

Heat Flux
²
Btu/hr ft
2,972
3,962
4,953
4,755
6,340
7,925
7,133
9,510
11,888
7,489
9,985
12,481

Burn Radius and Percent Difference* for
Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
36"/1,200 psia
36"/575 psia
14"/575psia 14"/1.200 psia
1,437(16)
982(16)
559(16)
381(16)
1,239
843
328
482
1,104(-11)
747(-11)
429(-11)
291(-11)
1,128(16)
764(17)
297(17)
439(16)
970
377
653
254
862(-11)
575(-12)
224(-12)
335(-11)
912(17)
611(18)
238(18)
355(17)
782
517
201
304
692(-12)
452(-13)
269(-12)
176(-12)
889(17)
594(18)
231(18)
346(17)
762
503
296
195
674(-12)
439(-13)
262(-11)
171(-12)

*Burn radius is the first value specified in the table; percent difference is parenthesized.

From Table 6.3, it can be seen that over and under estimating the heat flux by 25
percent can result in maximum variations in the burn radius of -13 percent and 18
percent, respectively. These variations are considered reasonable in light of the large
numerical variation in the heat flux values (i.e., variations of at least 990 Btu/hr It ).
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In Chapter 4, it was explained that Equation 4-12 does not account for the heat
ft²radiation. Appendix A indicates that this heat flux varies from 250 to
flux due to solar
²

380 Btu/hr ft . It a representative value for solar heat flux is selected to be 315 Btu/hr ft
(i.e., the midpoint of the solar heat flux range), then a comparison of the burn radii with
and without solar radiation can be made. This comparison is shown in Table 6.4, in
which the burn radii for the four pipeline conditions are calculated with and without the
contribution of the solar heat flux.

Table 6.4
Variation of Heat Flux Values (Contribution of Solar Heat Flux)

Heat Flux
²
Btu/hr ft

Burn Radius and Percent Difference* for
Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
36"/1.200 psia
36"/575 psia
14"/575psia 14"/1.200 psia

3,962
4,277

.328
315(-4)

482
463(-4)

843
809(-4)

1,239
1,191(-4)

6,340
6,655

254
247(-3)

377
368(-2)

653
635(-3)

970
946(-3)

9,510
9,825

201
197(-2)

304
299(-2)

517
507(-2)

782
768(-2)

9,985
10,300

195
192(-2)

296
291(-2)

503
493(-2)

762
749(-2)

*Bum radius is the first value specified in the table; percent difference is parenthesized.
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The results in Table 6.4 indicate that a variation in heat flux of several hundred
Btu's/hr ft ² will not have a significant impact on the burn radius. Therefore, the
assumption to exclude solar radiation during the development of Equation 4-12 is
appropriate.

6.2 Effect of Variation in Atmospheric Transmissivity on Burn Radius
During development of Equation 4-12, the following relationship was used to provide an
estimate of atmospheric transmissivity:
T=

0.79(100/r)¹/¹6(100/D)¹/¹6

(4-4)

where
r = relative humidity, %
D = distance to flame, feet
As explained in Chapter 4, the authors of this equation (36) caution that Equation
4-4 is "strictly applicable" when the flame is radiating at a temperature of 2240 ° F,
relative humidity is greater than 10%, dry bulb temperature is 80 ° F and the distance
from the flame is greater than 100 feet but less than 500 feet. However, the authors also
indicate that an "order of magnitude" estimate can be made under a wider range of
conditions. For purposes of simplifying Equation 4-12, a value for atmospheric
transmissivity was determined assuming a distance from the flame of 500 feet and a
relative humidity of 50 percent. Using Equation 4-4, this value was calculated to be
0.746.
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The sensitivity of the burn radius to changes in atmospheric transmissivity can be
evaluated at the four conditions identified in Section 6.1 by varying both the relative
humidity and the distance used in Equation 4-4. Table 6.5 provides the atmospheric
transmissivities that are obtained from Equation 4-4 when relative humidities range from
10 percent to 100 percent and distances vary from 100 to 500 feet:

Table 6.5
Atmospheric Transmissivities
Humidity,
Percent
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100

100

Distance from Flame - Feet
200
300

400

500

0.912
0.874
0.852
0.837
0.825
0.816
0.808
0.801
0.795
0.790

0.874
0.837
0.816
0.801
0.790
0.781
0.774
0.767
0.762
0.757

0.837
0.801
0.781
0.767
0.757
0.748
0.741
0.735
0.729
0.724

0.825
0.790
0.770
0.757
0.746
0.738
0.731
0.724
0.719
0.714

0.852
0.816
0.795
0.781
0.770
0.762
0.754
0.748
0.742
0.738

Table 6.5 indicates that for relative humidities from 10 to 100% and distances
from 100 to 500 feet, the transmissivity varies from 0.912 to 0.714. It can be seen that
the atmospheric transmissivity decreases with increasing relative humidity and distance,
since for these conditions a larger amount of thermal radiation is absorbed by the
atmosphere.
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It was previously mentioned that the burn radius produced by Equation 4-12
varies from 195 feet to 1,239 feet. The range of possible atmospheric transmissivities
associated with Equation 4-12 can be found by determining the transmissivities at the
smallest burn radius (and lowest applicable relative humidity) and at the highest burn
radius (and highest applicable relative humidity). The smallest burn radius and
applicable relative humidity is respectively considered to be 195 feet and 10 percent.
Using Equation 4-4, the atmospheric transmissivity is:
τ=

0.79(100110)

¹/¹6

(100/195)

¹/¹6

= 0.875
Since the maximum burn radius of 1,239 feet is outside the range for which
Equation 4-4 is strictly applicable, (i.e., 100 to 500 feet), the value of atmospheric
transmissivity at this distance is estimated using a general plot of transmissivity versus
path length (20). As indicated in (20), this plot is for a source temperature of 1400 K,
which is the general flame temperature for the burning of hydrocarbon fuels. From the
plot, the value of τ for a path length of 1,239 feet (or 378 meters) using the dashed line
representing 100 percent relative humidity (which will result in a minimum value of τ) is
approximately 0.470. Therefore, the atmospheric transmissivity can vary from a
maximum of 0.875 to a minimum of 0.470. Equation 4-12 can be rewritten to make τ a
variable by dividing the (4,036ft²82)P/K term by 0.746 (the previously assumed value of
T); the equation then becomes:
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BR = D{(4,036.82/0.746)P/K) - 37.52} ¹/²
= D{(5,411.29τ)P/K) - 37.521

¹0

(6-1)

The burn radius can now be computed at the four pipeline conditions using the
maximum, minimum and previously assumed values of τ. The results of these
calculations are provided in Table D.1 of Appendix D. In addition, Table D.2 of
Appendix D provides the percent difference between the burn radii that are calculated
using the assumed value of τ (0.746) and the burn radii that are calculated using the
maximum and minimum values of t (0.875 and 0.470, respectively). From Tables D.1
and D.2, it can be seen that Equation 4-12 can under predict and over predict the burn
radius by 9 percent and 34 percent, respectively. While an overestimation of the burn
radius by approximately a third may initially appear to be significant, it must be
remembered that this percentage corresponds to extreme conditions (i.e., relative
humidity of 100 percent and a distance of 1,239 feet from the flame). Furthermore, since
these percentages correspond to a range, the actual percent difference in any situation
would be expected to lie within this range and be less than the extreme values.
The combined effects of variations in heat flux and atmospheric transmissivity
can be shown through calculation of burn radii at the four pipeline conditions and heat
flux values identified in Table 6.3, using atmospheric transmissivities which vary from
0.470 to 0.875. Table D.3 in Appendix D provides the calculated burn radii at all of the
aforementioned conditions, while Table D.4 lists the percentage differences of these
variations from burn radii calculated at the previously described conditions (i.e., pipeline
diameters of 14 inches and 36 inches; incident operating pressures of 575 psia and 1,200
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²•
psia; heat flux values of 3,962 Btu/hr ft - ; 6,340 Btu/hr² ft ²— 9,510 Btu/hr ft — and 9,985
Btu/hr ft

²
;

and a value of 0.746 for atmospheric transmissivity). The largest variations

are seen for the combination of low

τ

and high K (i.e., "low" and "high" in relation to the

pipeline condition being considered); this combination results in underprediction of the
burn radius by an average of 33 percent. However, a combination of high

τ

and high K

result in an underprediction which averages only 3 percent. Conversely, a combination of
high τ and low K produces overpredictions of burn radii averaging 27 percent, while
combining a low τ with a low K results in an average underprediction of 9 percent. It
must again be noted that these percentages correspond to extreme conditions, and that
the actual percent difference in any situation would lie within ranges bounded by these
values.

6.3 Effect of Variation in Wind Speed and Direction on Burn Radius
As described previously, Equation 4-12 is developed assuming a vertical flame (i.e., no
wind) and, consequently, a symmetrical burn area. Graphical information has been
obtained from the Canadian TSB (L. Gales: personal communication, September 10,
1996) which relates heat flux to distance at wind speeds of 10 kilometers per hour (6.2
miles per hour) and 20 kilometers per hour (12.4 miles per hour) at upwind, downwind
and crosswind locations. The wind speeds cited herein are appropriate for this
discussion, since they span a range which is representative of many cities in the United
States. As an example, Table 6.6 provides the mean yearly wind speeds for several major
cities (55).
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Table 6.6
Wind Speeds for Several U.S. Cities

City

Mean Yearly Wind Speed,
miles per hour

Atlantic City, NJ
Newark, NJ
Philadelphia, PA
Charleston, SC
Madison, WI
Nashville, TN
Columbus, OH
Helena, MT
Shreveport, LA
Orlando, FL

10.1
10.2
9.5
8.6
9.8
8.0
8.5
7.7
8.4
8.5

The graphs were prepared for pipeline diameters of 24, 36 and 42 inches at a
pressure of 1,000 prig (1014.7 Asia) and, with the exception of graphs for the 42 inch
diameter pipeline (which is outside the diameter range of Equation 4-12), have been
provided in Appendix E. It should be noted that the graphs show the progression of heat
flux with time, with the curve for time zero at the top. It is this curve which produces the
maximum heat flux at a specified distance.
Burn radii at heat flux values of 9,510 Btu/hr ft ² ; 7,925 Btu/hr ft ² ; 6,340
²

Btu/hr ft and 4,755 Btu/hr ft ² were obtained from the time zero curves in Appendix E
and compared to distances determined using Equation 4-12. These heat flux values were
selected since they lie within the previously identified range of 3,962 Btu/hr ft ² to 9,985
Btu/hr ft - for which Equation 4-12 is applicable. Furthermore, these heat flux values
facilitate reading distances from the figures in Appendix E.
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The comparison of distances and the calculation of percentage differences is
respectively provided in Tables D.5 and D.6 (for the 24 inch diameter pipeline) and
Tables D.7 and D.8 (for the 36 inch diameter pipeline). The distances listed in Tables
D.5 and D.7 show that the burn radius is not symmetrical when there is wind, and that the
radius is greater in the downwind direction than in the upwind direction. From Tables
D.6 and D.8, it can be seen that the largest percentage difference between the Canadian
distances and the distances estimated with Equation 4-12 occurs for the upwind condition
(56 percent for the 36 inch diameter pipeline and 32 percent for the 24 inch diameter
pipeline), and that for upwind conditions the percentages decrease with decreasing wind
speed. However, an assumption was previously made that Equation 4-12 will predict the
longest dimension of a burn area, which would be the distance associated with the
downwind condition. The maximum percent difference between the Canadian distances
and the distances estimated using Equation 4-12 is less if the downwind
condition is considered: 27 percent for the 36 inch pipeline and -16 percent for the 24
inch pipeline. Furthermore, for all locations and wind speeds the percent difference
decreases with decreasing heat flux (so that overestimations are associated with a heat
2

flux of 9,510 Btu/hr ft and underestimations can appear when considering lower values
of heat flux). However, given the variability in weather conditions which may be
present during an actual pipeline rupture, the differences in burn radius cited herein are
considered to be reasonable.
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In summary, the analyses performed in this chapter serve to illustrate that the
assumptions made during the development of Equation 4-12 are appropriate. Equation
4-12 and the charts of Appendix B can be used to provide estimations of burn radii for
various pipeline diameters and incident operating pressures. However, it must be stressed
that safe separation distances determined through the use of Equation 4-12 or the
Appendix B charts are estimations. There are numerous variables, several of which have
been considered in this chapter, which will influence the burn radius associated with a
pipeline rupture. The advantage to using the method described in this thesis is that the
method is straightforward and provides reasonable estimates of actual burn radii.
The next chapter provides a summary of this thesis through several concluding
remarks. Recommendations are also made for additional work, which can be used to
refine the procedure for estimating safe separation distances.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The work described in this thesis has led to the development of a method for estimating safe
separation distances from natural gas transmission pipelines. This method was verified based on
information from actual pipeline accidents, and provides a means to determine the safe
separation distance, as a measurement of the burn radius, through knowledge of the pipeline's
diameter and incident operating pressure. The method can be used by regulators to determine
the distances at which future development might be placed from existing pipelines or, perhaps
more realistically, the method can be used to evaluate appropriate incident operating pressures
for pipelines which traverse densely populated areas.
The procedure described in this thesis is easy to apply and does not require extensive
computational efforts. The basis for estimation is Equation 4-12, which describes the burn radius
as a function of a pipelines's diameter and incident operating pressure. As illustrated in the
charts found in Appendix B of this thesis, Equation 4-12 is readily represented in graphical form.
The method is applicable to pipelines with diameters ranging from 14 inches to 36 inches and
incident operating pressures from 575 psia to 1,200 psia, which constitute the mass majority of
natural gas transmission pipelines in service in the United States. For levels of thermal radiation
damage corresponding to heat flux values from 3,962 Btu/hr ft 2 to 9,985 Btu/hr ft 2 , the method
will predict safe separation distances ranging from 195 feet to 1,200 feet. The range of heat flux
values noted above are applicable to the major consequences to life, limb and property that
should be of interest to most analysts.

89

90
Several recommendations can be made for future research endeavors that can refine the
work that has been performed herein. As advances are made in the areas of fire protection and
hazard assessment, new information may be developed concerning the relationship between heat
flux levels and corresponding levels of thermal radiation damage. This new information can then
be used to prepare burn radius charts for which the heat flux level corresponding to a specified
level of damage is more accurately known. Another recommended area for future work includes
the refinement of the procedure to predict atmospheric transmissivity, as the current method only
provides order of magnitude estimates at distances beyond 500 feet.
A recommendation can also be made with regard to the reporting of pipeline accident
data, since the reports produced by the NTSB and the Canadian TSB vary in the type and amount
of accident-related information. Consistent reporting of data such as the volume of gas released,
the duration of release and flame characteristics would be beneficial, in that the model developed
in this thesis can be tested more accurately. Furthermore, this additional information may also be
used to expand the diameter and pressure ranges for which Equation 4-12 is applicable
Although there are areas amenable to refinement, the methodology proposed herein will
provide reasonable estimates of safe separation distances for the ranges of diameters, incident
operating pressures and values of heat flux that have been previously identified.

APPENDIX A - HEAT FLUX LEVELS
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
Heat Flux
²
Btu/hr ft kW/m²
²

2 2**

0.7

250-380**

Reference
Number

Consequence

37

Exposed skin reddens and burns on
prolonged exposure.

0.79-1.2

32, 35

Heat flux of solar radiation.

300

0.95**

***

115 seconds to severe pain; 663 seconds to
second degree burn.

317**

1

34, 39

Level which is just tolerable by a clothed
person. Also, this is the heat flux of solar
radiation on a clear, hot summer day.

380**

1ft²2

56

Solar heat flux at noontime during the
summer.

500*

1.57*

39

Flux limit from a flare if personnel are
required to work in the area.

500*

1.58*

35

Value of heat flux for a flare where
personnel are continuously exposed.

500

1.58**

36

Level at which personnel should not be
exposed to for more than 2 hours.

500

1.6

39

Level to produce minor discomfort.

507**

1.6

32, 34, 56

Minimum heat flux to be painful. Also,
no discomfort felt for long exposures to the
thermal radiation.

550-555**

1.74-1.75

35, 37

Pain threshold occurs after 60 second
exposure.

600

1.89**

***

45 seconds to severe pain; 187 seconds to
second degree burn.

634**

2.0

37

Causes damage to PVC insulated cables.

²
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)

Heat Flux
Btu/hr ft kW/m²
-

Reference
Number

Consequence

666**

2.1

56

Minimum heat flux necessary to
cause pain after 1 minute.

740

7.33

35

Pain threshold reached at 40 seconds.

920

2.90

35

Pain threshold reached at 30 seconds.

1,000*

3.15*

39

Heat flux from flare at which personnel can
quickly leave the immediate vicinity without
being harmed.

1,000

3.15**

***, 36

Level at which personnel should not be
exposed to for more than 10 minutes. Also,
27 seconds to severe pain and 92 seconds to
second degree burn.

1,268**

4.0

37, 34

0% fatality at this heat flux level. However,
heat flux is sufficient to cause pain to
personnel if they cannot reach shelter in
20 seconds. Also, blistering of the skin
(second degree burns) is likely.

1,300

4.1**

***

18 seconds to severe pain and 57 seconds to
second degree burn.

1.490**

4.7

56

Heat flux level which causes pain in 15-20
seconds and injury after 30 seconds. Also,
this is the recommended flux level for
residential areas at a frequency of
50x10-6/yr.
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Heat Flux
kW/m²
B tu/hr ft

Reference
Number

Consequence

1500

4.73

35, 40, 57

Pain threshold for a 15-16 second exposure.
After this time period, blistering and
permanent skin damage can occur. Also,
this is the heat flux in areas where
emergency actions occuring for several
minutes may be performed by personnel
without shielding but with appropriate
clothing. This is also the level which can
be tolerated for an indefinite period of time
by an active worker wearing a hard hat, long
sleeve shirt and gloves.

1,500

4.73**

36

Level at which personnel should not he
exposed to for more than 2 minutes.

1,585**

5.0

37

Pain threshold reached after a 15 second
exposure.

.05.;_,k

1,600

13 seconds to severe pain and 40 seconds to
second degree burn

1,650

5:7**

57

Heat flux which can be tolerated up to 5
minutes by a person wearing a hard
hat, long sleeve shirt and gloves.

1,900

5.99**

***

11 seconds to severe pain and 30 seconds to
second degree burn.

1,902**

6

58

Bare skin blisters if this heat flux is
experienced for 20 seconds.

2,000

6.31**

36

Level at which personnel should not be
exposed to for more than 20 seconds.
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Reference
Heat Fluxft²
-7
Btu/hr ft kW/m² Number
-

Consequence

2,000079**

6.3-6.4

35, 37, 38

Pain threshold reached in 8 seconds and
blistering occurs in 20 seconds. This is the
maximum tolerable heat flux for short term
human exposure. This is also the heat
intensity in areas where emergency actions
lasting up to 1 minute may be required by
personnel without shielding but with
appropriate clothing.

2, 2 00

6.94

35

9 second exposure results in the pain
threshold.

2,500

7.89**

***

7 seconds to severe pain and 20 seconds to
second de g ree burn.

2,536**

8

39

Death occurs within minutes unless
appropriate shelter is found.

3,000

9.46

35, 57

Pain threshold reached in 6 seconds. This is
also the value of heat flux (if solar radiation
is included) for a flare at any location to
which people have access (such as at grade
underneath the flare or a service platform of
a nearby tower). In this instance exposure
should be limited to a few seconds since the
heat flux level is adequate for escape only.
Furthermore, limited over-exposure of a
person wearing hard hat, long sleeve shirt
and gloves results in a skin reaction similar
to a mild sunburn.

3ft²01 1"

9.5

32, 34, 37

Pain threshold occurs in 6-8 seconds, and
second degree burns occur after 20 sec.

3,200

10.09

*4 *

5 seconds to severe pain and 14 seconds to
second degree burn.

,
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Heat Flux
k \Wm
Btu/hr ft`

-

Reference
Number

Consequence

3,700

11.67

35

Pain threshold reached at 4 seconds.

3,709**

11.7

56

Mechanical integrity of thin, partially
insulated steel can be lost.

3,800

11.99**

***

4 seconds to severe pain and 11 seconds to
second degree burn.

3,962**

12.5

32, 34, 37

Piloted ignition of wood exposed to this heat
flux for a prolonged period. Also, plastic
tubing melts.

3,994**

12.6

32, 34, 39,
56

Exposed, dry, unpainted wood can beignited
at this heat flux. Piloted ignition of cotton
can also occur. This is the recommended
flux level for residential areas at a frequency
of I 10x10-6/yr. Flammable materials in
buildings may be damaged after 1,000
seconds.

4,000

12.5

39

Suitable heat flux level for control rooms or
workshops.

4,755**

15.0

37

This is the heat flux limit of Class 2
building materials.

5,000*

15.77

35

Heat intensity on plant structures and in
locations where operators are not likely to be
working and where shelter from radiant heat
is available.

5,072**

16.0

37, 39

Severe burns occur after 5 seconds, and
wood ignites spontaneously.

6,300

19.87

35

Pain threshold reached in 2 seconds.
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Heat Flux
Btu/hr ft
kW/m²-

Reference
Number

6,340**20

58

A four second exposure causes blistering of
bare skin. This is also the heat flux level at
which 1% lethality occurs for a twenty
second exposure.

7,291**

56

Mechanical integrity of thin, uninsulated
steel can be lost. This is also the
recommended flux level for potentially
hazardous adjacent installations at a
frequency of 50x10

23.0

Consequence

-

7,500

23.7

35

White rats experience burns on their bare
skin in approximately 6 seconds.

7,925**

25.0

37

Prolonged exposure at this heat flux ignites
wood.

9,510**

30.0

37

Heat flux limit for Class I building
materials.

9,985**

31.5

40

After a few minutes exposure to this heat
flux, wooden buildings, paper, window
drapes and trees ignite spontaneously.

10,778**

34

58

Piloted ignition of cellulosic material for a
twenty second exposure.

11,095**

35

58

50% lethality occurs for a twenty second
exposure to this heat flux.

11,887**

37.5

32, 34

Process equipment becomes damaged. This
is also the minimum energy required to
ignite wood at indefinitely long exposures.
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Heat Flux
²
Btu/hr ft kW/m

Reference
Number

11,983**

37.8

34

Flammable materials in process installations
can be damaged after an exposure of 1,000
seconds.

12,046**

38

56

Heat flux (for a 20 second exposure)
corresponding to 50% mortality.

20,922**

66

58

Piloted ignition of cellulosic material in four
seconds. Also, 1% lethality for a four
second exposure.

37,089

117

58

Heat flux resulting in 50% lethality for a
four second exposure.

39

(I-25,400)t 4/5 = 6,730
for spontaneous ignition of wood; 1
in units of W/m ².

39

(I-13,400)t ²/³ = 8,050
for piloted ignition of wood; 1 in units
of W/m .

²

Various Flux Levels and
Exposure Times

39

Consequence

ignto

1.15

First degree burns assumed if (01
>
550,0700; t in seconds and I expressed as
W/m².

34

Graph of tolerance times to burn-injury
levels for various incident heat fluxes.
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Table A.1
Summary of Heat Flux Levels
(Continued)
Heat Flux
Btu/hr ft kW/m²
-

Reference
Number
34

Consequence
.Average heat flux which will cause severe
blistering based on duration: q 7 = 50/tc 0.7¹ ,
q 7 in kW/square meter and t c in seconds.

NOTES
Includes solar radiation
**

Calculated using the relationship: 1 Btu/hr ft - = 3.1546 W/m

***

Provided in material obtained from the TSB of Canada (personal communication,
February 28, 1997).

APPENDIX B - BURN RADIUS CHARTS
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Figure B.1 - Burn Radius for 14" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.2 - Burn Radius for 16" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.3 - Burn Radius for 18" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.4 - Burn Radius for 20" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.5 - Burn Radius for 24" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
-
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Figure B.6 - Burn Radius for 30" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.7 - Burn Radius for 36" Diameter Pipeline
K = 3,962 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.8 - Burn Radius for 14" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.9 - Burn Radius for 16" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.10 - Burn Radius for 18" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.11 - Burn Radius for 20" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.12 - Burn Radius for 24" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.13 - Burn Radius for 30" Diameter Pipeline
K 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.14 - Burn Radius for 36" Diameter Pipeline
K = 6,340 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.15 - Burn Radius for 14" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.16 - Burn Radius for 16" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.17 - Burn Radius for 18" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.18 - Burn Radius for 20" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.19 - Burn Radius for 24" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.20 - Burn Radius for 30" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.21 - Burn Radius for 36" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,510 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.22 - Burn Radius for 14" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft
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Figure B.23 - Burn Radius for 16" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.24 - Burn Radius for 18" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.25 - Burn Radius for 20" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.26 - Burn Radius for 24" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.27 - Burn Radius for 30" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure B.28 - Burn Radius for 36" Diameter Pipeline
K = 9,985 Btu/hr sq. ft.
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Figure C.1 - Detailed View of Edison Accident
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DURHAM WOODS

Figure C.2 - Identification of Apartment Buildings

132

Figure C.3 - Illustration of Apartments Used for Development
of an Appropriate Scale
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Figure C.4 - Comparison of Flux Levels Experienced Versus Levels for Blistering

.1
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30

35 Bar
522.3 psia
56
66
**
**
**
**

65 Bar
957.4 psia
66
66
66
82
98
115

95 Bar
1392.6 psia
82
82
82
82
115
148
35 Bar
522.3 psia
184
211
237
316
395
474

65 Bar
957.4 psia
962
299
337
449
561
673

95 Bar
1200.0 psia
296
339
381
508
635
762

Safe Separation Distance - Feet
Using Equation 4-12

Notes: *Distances converted from meters to feet using the reationship 1 meter equals 3.2808 feet.
**Distances determined on a case by case basis.

Diameter
Inch
14
16
18
24
30
36

Distance from Pipeline - Feet*
From Dutch Regulations

Table C.1.
Comparison of Building Distances to Safe Separation Ditances

1

Diameter
Ratio
Selected
16"/14"
18"/14"
24"/14"
30"/14"
36' /14"
18"/16"
24"/16"
30"/16"
36"/16"
24"/18"
30"/18"
36"/18"
30"/24"
36"/24"
36"/30"
35 Bar
522.3 psia
1.18
65 Bar
957.4 psia
1.00
1.00
124
1.48
1.74
1.00
124
1.48
1.74
1.24
1.48
1.74
1.20
1.40
1.17

Ratios of Building Distances
(Using Dutch Regulations)
95 Bar
1392.6 psia
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.40
1.80
1.00
1.00
1.40
1.80
1.00
1.40
1.80
1.40
1.80
1.29

35 Bar
522.3 psia
1.14
1.29
1.71
2.14
2.57
1.13
1.50
1.88
2.25
1.: 3 3
1.67
2.00
1.25
1.50
1.20

65 Bar
957.4 psia
1.14
1.29
1.71
2.14
2.57
1.13
1.50
1.88
2)5
I.33
1.67
2.00
1.25
1.50
1.20

95 Bar
1200.0 psia
1.14
1.29
1.71
2.14
2.57
1.13
1.50
1.88
2.25
1.33
1.67
2.00
1.25
1.50
1.20

Ratios of Separation Distances
(Using Equation 4-12)

Table C.2
Ratios of Building and Separation Distances at Various Diameters (Constant Pressure)

C_11

Diameter
14"
16"
18"
24"
30"
36"

957.4/522.3
psia
1.18
1.00

1,392.6/522.3
psia
1.46
1.24

Ratios of Building, Distances
(Using Dutch Regulations)
1,392.6/957.4
psia
1.24
1.24
1.24
1.00
1.17
1.29
957.4/522.3
psia
1.42
1.42
1.42
1.42
1.42
1.42

1,200.0/522.3
psia
1.61
1.61
1.61
1.61
1.61
1.61

1,200.0/957.4
psia
1.13
1.13
1.13
1.13
1.13
1.13

Ratios of Separation Distances
(Using Equation 4-12)

Table C.3
Ratios of Building and Separation Distances at Various Pressures (Constant Diameter)

APPENDIX D - VARIATION OF BURN RADIUS INFORMATION
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The following pages provide tables, referenced in Chapter 6, which serve to demonstrate
the influence of the following factors on the burn radius:
Atmospheric transmissivity;
Heat flux and atmospheric transmissivity (combined); and
-

Wind direction and speed.

It should be remembered that the various burn radii are calculated using Equation 4-12.

²

Value of τ

3,962
6.340
9.510
9.985

357
277
221
215

328
254
201
195

255
195
151
146

Btu/hr ft0.875 0.746 0.470

Heat Flux

14"/575 psia

482
377
304
296

379
295
236
229
918
713
568
552

843
653
517
503

656
500
388
376

1,345 1,239 975
1,055 970
758
852
782
606
830
762
589

0.875 0.746 0.470

0.875 0.746 0.470

0.875 0.746 0.470
523
410
331
323

Value of τ

Value of τ

36'71,200 psia

Value of τ

Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
36"/575 psia
l4"/1,200 psia

Table D.1
Variation of Burn Radius with Atmospheric Transmissivity

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
-8
27
-8
28
-8
29
-8
29

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
-8
29
31.
-8
-9
33
-9
34

Value of t
0.875 0.746 0.470
-8
27
28
-8
-8
29
-8
29

3691,200 psia

Note: Since τ = 0.746 is the assumed value for atmospheric transmissivity, there are no entries in those columns.

"

Value of τ
Heat Flux
Btu/hr ft 0.875 0.746 0.470
29
3,962.
-8
-8
30
6.340
-9
33
9ft²510
-9
34
9.985

149575 psia

Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
36"/575 psia
1491,200 psia

Percent Difference Between Burn Radii Obtained Using Assumed Vane of τ and Burn Radii Determinued
Using Maximum and Minimum Values of -c

Table I).2

346
296
262

355
304
269
269
229
201

277
236
207

650
552
484

668
568
498

833
713
630

594
503
439

611
517
452

764
653
575

452
376
321

466
388
333

592
500
436

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
768
1,067 982
656
843
918
578
815
747

967
830
736

992
852
756

889
762
674

912
782
692

692
589
518

711
606
533

1,225 1,128 885
758
1,055 970
862
938
671

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
1,559 1,437 1,132
1,345 1,239 975
1,199 1,104 866

36"/1,200 psia

Note: Center value of each 3x3 subtable is considered to be the reference value, around which conditions are varied.

376
323
286

253
215
188

7.489
9.985
12.481

176
146
125

386
331
294

181
151
129

238
201
176

260
221
194

7,133
9,510
11.888

231
195
171

476
410
365

230
195
170

297
254
224

324
277
245

4,755
6,340
7,925

344
295
261

0.875 0.746 0.470
440
559
606
379
523
482
429
337
466

0.875 0.746 0.470
415
298
381
255
357
328
225
291
317

Btu/hr ft
2,972
3.962
4,953
439
377
335

Value of τ

Value of τ

²

Heat Flux

14"/575psia

Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/incident Operating Pressure
36"/575 psia
14"/1,200 psia

Table D.3
Variation of Burn Radii
For Combined Variations in Heat Flux and Atmospheric Transmissivity

29
10
-3

30
10
-4

7,133
9.510
11.888

7.489
9.985
12.481

29
10
-4

18
---13

17
---12
-10
-25
-36

27
9
-3
-9
-23
-32

17
---11

27
9
-3

-10
-25
-36

18
---12

17
---12

27
9
-3
-10
-25
-36
18
---13

29
10
-4

-9
_22
-32

17
---12

27
9
-3

-10
-25
-36

18
---12

16
---1)

26
9
-3

-9
-23
-32

-9
-23
-32

-9
-22
-31

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
26
16
-9
9
---21
-11
-30
-3

-9
-23
-33

17
---12

28
9
-4

16
---11

26
9
-3

-9
-23
-33

17
---12

-9
._22
-31

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
27
16
-9
--9
-22
-11
-31
-3

36"/1,200 psia

Note: Entries designated by "---" indicate conditions at which the burn radius is considered to be the reference value.

28
9
-4

4,755
6.340
7,925

²

Value of τ
Heat Flux
Btu/hr ft 0.875 0.746 0.470
27
16
-9
2,972
9
-22
--3.962
-31
-I1
4,953
-3

Value of τ
0.875 0.746 0.470
26
16
-9
9
---21
-11
-30
-3

14"/575psia

Pipeline Conditions - Diameter/Incident Operating Pressure
14"/1,200 psia
36"/575 psia

Table D.4
Percent Difference in Burn Radii
For Combined 'Variations in Heat Flux and Atmospheric Transmissivity

Note: U.W. = Upwind
D.W. = Downwind
C.W. = Crosswind

²

Wind Speed
Heat Flux
12.4 miles/hr
kW/m²
Btu/hr ft U.W. D.W. C.W.
9,510
361
472
30
427
25
7,925
413
548
469
20
6,340
466
686
545
15
4,755
607
823
732
Wind Speed
6.2 miles/hr
U.W. D.W. C.W.
443
420
394
443
489
466
495
600
535
732
682
778

Distance to Specified Heat Flux - Feet

Table D.5
Variation of Burn Radius with Wind Direction and Speed
24" Diameter Pipeline, P = 1,000 psig

Equation 4-12.
476
525
592
689

47;143 1

Note: U.W. = Upwind
D.W. = Downwind
C.W. = Crosswind

.

30
25
20
15

²

Heat Flux
kW/m Btu/hr ft²
9,51()
7,925
6,340
4.755

Wind Speed
12.4 miles/hr
U.W. D.W.
32
1
27
-4
27
-14
14
-16
C.W.
11
12
9
-6

Wind Speed
6.2 miles/hr
U.W. D.W. C.W.
21
7
13
7
19
13
20
-1
11
1
-11
-6

Table D.6
Percent Difference between. Equation 4-12 and the Canadian Values
24" Diameter Pipeline, P = 1,000 psig

Note: U.W. = Upwind
D.W. = Downwind
C.W. = Crosswind

Heat Flux
²
Mim² ²Btu/hr ft 2
9,510
30
7,925
25
6,340
20
4,755
15

Wind Speed
12.4 miles/hr
U.W. D.W. C.W.
492
459
656
656
764
538
791
922
686
1,177 1,047
899

Wind Speed
6.2 miles/hr
U.W. D.W. C.W.
492
564
499
597
702
646
751
823
794
1,112 1,030
984

Distance to Specified Heat Flux - Feet

Table D.7
Variation of Burn Radius with Wind Direction and Speed
36" Diameter Pipeline, P = 1,000 psig

Equation 4-12
714
788
888
1,033

145

Note: U.W. = Upwind
D.W. = Downwind
C.W. = Crosswind

30
25
20
15

²

²

Wind Speed
Heat Flux
12.4 miles/hr
kW/m Btu/hr ft U.W. D.W. C.W.
56
9
45
9,510
46
3
20
7,925
-4
29
12
6,340
-1
4,755
15
-12

Wind Speed
6.2 miles/hr
U.W. D.W. C.W.
43
45
27
32
12
22
18
8
12
5
-7
0.3

Table D.8
Percent Difference between Equation 4-12 and the Canadian. Values
36" Diameter Pipeline, P = 1,000 psig

APPENDIX E - CANADIAN HEAT FLUX INFORMATION
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Exhibit No.

Undertaking given by Mr. Rothwell to Mr. Abes at Transcript
Volume 4, Page 468

Q.

To provide a revised Response to NEB IR. No. 23 re Thermal
Radiation Curves.

A.

The attached families of curves show the variation of thermal radiation
flux with distance for NPS 24, 36 and 42 pipe at an operating pressure of
1000 psig and with wind speeds of 10 and 20 km/h. Other conditions are
the same as those for Figures 23.2 to 23.9 of the original response. For
each case, plots for upwind, downwind and crosswind directions are
given.
Since Board Staff's request concerned the predictions immediately after
ignition, we have elected not to incur the delay which would have been
associated with the production of colour copies of the plots. However, to
follow the evolution with time of the thermal radiation flux on the
monochrome copies,. it is sufficient to recall that the curves are sequential
with time from :op to bottom, i.e. the curve for time 0 Is at the top and the
curve for time 900 is at the bottom.
As was discussed qualitatively at Transcription Page 465, the distances
to specified levels of thermal radiation increase somewhat in the
downwind direction and decrease in the upwind direction. It is normal in
detailed risk assessments to take into account the statistical variation of
wind direction.
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